


CTC

TRENDS

National Training Center (NTC)

No. 98-4

FEB 98



**3QFY97 and 4QFY97
with Techniques and Procedures that Work!**

**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350**

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER TRENDS AND TTPs, 3RD AND 4TH QUARTERS, FY 97

The CALL Lessons Learned Division, CTC Branch, collects these trends and TTPs from the respective Observer/Controller (OC) teams and compiles the results. Organized by the Battlefield Operating System (BOS), the trends reflect both *Positive Performance* and *Needs Emphasis* based on quarterly assessment. Trends and TTPs from NTC's Leader Training Program (LTP) and senior NCOs are included when available.

Each of the trends is annotated according to Final Draft, TRADOC Pam 11-9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield*, dated 10 September 1993. **The trends are numbered sequentially for ease of reference, and are not in any priority order.** A statement of the problem or positive performance is provided with supporting observations and suggested TTPs.

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 3rd & 4th Qtrs, FY97

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(NOTE: Trends are numbered sequentially for ease of reference, and are not in any priority order.)

INTELLIGENCE BOS (TA.5)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) plan development (TA.5.1)

TREND 2: Task Force integration of reconnaissance training into Home Station training (TA.5.1)

TREND 3: Scout platoon execution of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations (TA.5.1)

TREND 4: (LTP) Planning and supervising the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort (TA.5.1)

TREND 5: (LTP) Brigade S2 products preparation (TA.5.1)

TREND 6: (LTP) S2 understanding of enemy tactics (TA.5.1)

TREND 7: (LTP) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) plan refinement (TA.5.1)

TREND 8: (LTP) Engineer involvement in reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning (*TA.5.1*)

TREND 9: Integration of Air Defense into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) (*TA.5.2.1*)

TREND 10: (LTP) Air Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Development (*TA.5.2.1*)

TREND 11: (LTP) Brigade S2 maintenance of enemy Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) (*TA.5.2.2.5*)

TREND 12: Task Force (TF) S2 terrain analysis (*TA.5.3.2*)

TREND 13: (LTP) Engineer unit use of the Terra Base computer software program (*TA.5.3.2*)

TREND 14: Event templates and matrices (*TA.5.3.4.1*)

TREND 15: Situation Templates (SITEMPS) for use in R&S Planning (*TA.5.3.4.1*)

TREND 16: Task Force (TF) S2 development of enemy courses of action (COAs) (*TA.5.4.2*)

TREND 17: (LTP) S2 Situation template (SITEMP) adjustments (*TA.5.4.4*)

MANEUVER BOS (TA.1)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Heavy task force (TF) use of dismounted infantry (*TA.1.1.1*)

TREND 2: Engagement area development (*TA.1.2*)

TREND 3: Company/team maneuver at the objective (*TA.1.2*)

TREND 4: (LTP) Establishment of support-by-fire (SBF) positions (*TA.1.2*)

TREND 5: Company/team use of direct fires during offensive missions
(*TA.1.2.1*)

TREND 6: Company direct fire planning (*TA.1.2.1*)

TREND 7: Company shifting of direct fires (*TA.1.2.1*)

TREND 8: Maneuver unit understanding of enemy engagement areas and actions on the
objective (*TA.1.2.2*)

TREND 9: Integration of direct fire with maneuver (*TA.1.4*)

TREND 10: (LTP) Synchronization of supporting fires (*TA.1.4*)

TREND 11: (LTP) Task force (TF) integration of heavy and light forces (*TA.1.4*)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS (TA.2)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Fire Support Observation Plan (*TA.2.1.1*)

TREND 2: Assignment of reconnaissance objectives for aviation assets (*TA.2.1.1*)

TREND 3: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicles (BSFVs) in ground support role (*TA.2.2.1*)

TREND 4: (LTP) Fire Support integration (*TA.2.3*)

AIR DEFENSE BOS (TA.3)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Directed early warnings during air defense operations (TA.3.1.1)

TREND 2: Establishing air defense artillery (ADA) priorities (TA.3.3)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) (TA.6)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Design and integration of obstacles (TA.6.2.2)

TREND 2: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) area security (TA.6.3.1.1)

TREND 3: Security in the field trains (TA.6.3.1.1)

TREND 4: (LTP) Brigade fratricide risks during brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations (TA.6.3.1.1)

TREND 5: Integration of air and ground operations during security missions (TA.6.3.2)

TREND 6: Security Operations (TA.6.3.4)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS (TA.7)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Recovery missions (TA.7.3.2.2)

TREND 2: Allocation of medical platoon personnel (TA.7.4.4)

TREND 3: (LTP) Planning for Combat Health Support (CHS) (TA.7.4.4)

TREND 4: Scout platoon maintenance and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)

TREND 5: Class III and V reporting and tracking (TA.7.5.2)

TREND 6: Supply and distribution of engineer Class IV and V materials
(TA.7.5.2)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (TA.4)

Needs Emphasis

- TREND 1: Command Post site location and displacement planning (TA.4.1)
- TREND 2: Non-mission capable (NMC) vehicle status reporting in the task force (TF) (TA.4.1.2)
- TREND 3: Mechanized and armor company/team command information flow and battle tracking (TA.4.1.3)
- TREND 4: Task force (TF) fire support element (FSE) situational awareness (TA.4.1.3)
- TREND 5: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) command post (CP) battle tracking. (TA.4.1.3)
- TREND 6: Field trains command post (FTCP) battle tracking (TA.4.1.3)
- TREND 7: Task force (TF) staffs and command posts (CPs) battle tracking (TA.4.1.3)
- TREND 8: (LTP) Battalion Tactical Operation Center (TOC) dissemination of current enemy situation (TA.4.1.3)
- TREND 9: (LTP) Risk management (TA.4.2)
- TREND 10: (LTP) Company/team commanders' situational awareness (TA.4.2)
- TREND 11: (LTP) Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) (TA.4.2.1)
- TREND 12: Engineer force development of decision points for changing situations (TA.4.2.3)
- TREND 13: Task force development of the fire support plan during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) (TA.4.3)
- TREND 14: Maintenance planning at the task force (TF) level (TA.4.3)
- TREND 15: Planning for employment of attack helicopters (TA.4.3)
- TREND 16: (LTP) Brigade staff understanding of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) (TA.4.3)

- TREND 17: (LTP) Task force focus on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) vice doctrine (TA.4.3)
- TREND 18: (LTP) Aviation Liaison Officer (ALO) integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) (TA.4.3)
- TREND 19: (LTP) Brigade planning for fire support (TA.4.3)
- TREND 20: (LTP) Armor task force (TF) understanding of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) (TA.4.3)
- TREND 21: (LTP) Integration of Special Staff into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) (TA.4.3)
- TREND 22: (LTP) Rear battle planning (TA.4.3)
- TREND 23: (LTP) Task force wargaming (TA.4.3.4)
- TREND 24: (LTP) Task force (TF) synchronization of tactical operations (TA.4.3.4)
- TREND 25: (LTP) Brigade targeting team (TA.4.3.4)
- TREND 26: Battalion maintenance officer (BMO) troop leading procedures (TA.4.4)
- TREND 27: Engineer company time management and tactical assembly area (TAA) discipline (TA.4.4)
- TREND 28: (LTP) Brigade S2 section use of standard operating procedures (SOPs) (TA.4.4)
- TREND 29: (LTP) Company/team development and use of Tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) (TA.4.4)

- TREND 30: Integration of the medical platoon into the planning process
(TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 31: Task force (TF) timeline management (TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 32: Engineer company planning process (TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 33: Integration of engineer units into the planning process (TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 34: (LTP) Essential fire support (FS) tasks and concept of fires development
(TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 35: (LTP) Task force (TF) executive officer (XO) management of timelines
(TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 36: (LTP) Time management (TA.4.4.1)
- TREND 37: Task force (TF) fire support rehearsals (TA.4.4.1.1)
- TREND 38: Direct fire plan rehearsals (TA.4.4.1.1)
- TREND 39: Maintenance personnel crew-served and individual weapons cleaning (TA.4.4.4)
- TREND 40: Unit discipline on the battlefield (TA.4.4.4)
- TREND 41: Breach tenets in mission analysis and course of action (COA)
development (TA.4.4.5)
- TREND 42: Integrating aviation planning into the scheme of maneuver
(TA.4.4.5)
- TREND 43: (LTP) Synchronization of Tactical Operations (TA.4.4.5)

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 3rd and 4th Quarters, FY 97

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC O/Cs for 3rd and 4th quarters, FY97. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with *Blueprint of the Battlefield* codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) plan development. Task Force (TF) S2s and assistant S2s continue their role as the only planners in the R&S effort.

RESULTS:

1. Leaving the TF S2 to solely develop the R&S effort means no integrated product (i.e., no R&S OPORD).
2. Fire integration, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and task and purpose are often left out.
3. NAIs are often not prioritized, infiltration routes and OP repositioning plans are not addressed.
4. Weak PIRs are not linked to NAIs.
5. Scouts are often sent out late without an enemy SITEMP. Most TFs only provide the scouts with an R&S matrix, frequently giving inaccurate start and stop times.

Techniques:

1. R&S plans must be integrated with input from other staff planners.
2. TFs should produce an R&S OPORD written by the S3 with input from all staff elements.
3. The S2 should include the enemy SITEMP in the R&S order for timely receipt of this information by the scouts.
4. Staff synchronization is necessary for the TF R&S plan (OPORD) to work.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 2: Task Force integration of reconnaissance training into Home Station training.

PROBLEM: Task forces (TFs) do not adequately train reconnaissance planning, preparation, execution, and support at Home Station. Home Station recon training is often left up to the scout platoon leader.

RESULT: Recon training is limited to section or platoon training with very narrow objectives and no integration of other TF assets.

Techniques:

1. Recon is a *mission*, not a unit. The TF must take responsibility for the integration of all available assets toward achieving the recon objective.
 - a. First, the commander and S3, with the S2's recommendation, identify what information is required for the TF to be successful in the upcoming operation. This information should focus on both friendly and enemy decision points and how to influence (enemy) or facilitate (friendly) decisions. Setting these priorities normally provides sufficient focus for the limited assets available to the TF and prevents overwhelming reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) tasking.
 - b. Second, the S3 determines the force necessary to defeat enemy forces templated or known between his TF and the recon objective.
 - c. Third, the S3 creates a recon force that has sufficient combat power to achieve that objective or recommends a new objective based on availability of forces.
2. Consider the following planning factors in recon operations:
 - a. CASEVAC
 - b. indirect fire support
 - c. communications
 - d. resupply

Against an armored and dedicated enemy, all of these things quickly exceed the capabilities of a HMMWV-equipped scout platoon. Bradley-equipped scouts are more likely to achieve recon objectives without TF support, but the planning factors remain the same. Limitations are often not discovered until scout platoons are rendered combat ineffective, unable to contribute to TF success.

3. The TF must ensure the integration of recon training at Home Station. R&S planning must be integrated into every orders drill so that usable products are produced prior to R&S execution.

4. The TF recon must have sufficient force to accomplish the mission.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3: Scout platoon execution of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task forces often task only scout platoon assets for R&S execution.
2. As the rotation continues, the scout platoon is tasked to conduct either recon or surveillance on a constant basis.
3. Some missions may require a larger number of assets to cover NAIs than the scout platoon can provide.
4. Little consideration is given for allowing time to rest, conduct rehearsals, or perform maintenance.
5. No other elements are tasked to replace or augment the scout platoon mission.
6. METT-T is not taken into consideration when executing the R&S plan.

RESULT: The scout platoon is over-tasked and unable to maintain the level of readiness required to achieve the R&S mission.

Techniques:

1. Train other infantry platoon elements to augment or replace the scout platoon according to METT-T. All mechanized infantry squads, sections, or platoons should be capable of such a mission.
2. Assess the scout platoon readiness level when developing the R&S plan.
 - a. If the organic scout platoon is not at a readiness level to complete the mission, then another trained asset should be tasked.
 - b. If the NAI coverage for a particular mission exceeds the scout platoon's capabilities, task other assets to augment the recon force.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 4: (LTP) Planning and supervising the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigades rarely think of R&S as a continuous process. When brigade staffs plan the R&S effort in support of a mission, they rarely identify R&S as a continuous process to include preparation and execution phases.
2. Once R&S assets are in place, brigades rarely follow-up; they do not put pressure on specific collectors to provide the information that they were tasked to provide.
3. When the brigade issues the R&S order, subordinate units are rarely tasked to provide their plans back to the brigade to be deconflicted.

RESULT: Major issues such as terrain management of forces, identification of gaps in collection, verification of coverage for surveillance, and conflicts in tasks are not readily identified nor resolved prior to R&S execution.

Techniques:

1. The brigade must address R&S as a continuous operation for all phases of the mission.
2. The brigade must deconflict and integrate R&S plans into a finished brigade product; therefore, tasking subordinate units to submit their plans to the brigade is a must.
3. The R&S plan is a wasted effort if the brigade is not prepared to supervise the subordinate unit's assigned tasks. Brigade XOs, Battle Captains, staff members, and command post (CP) personnel must be trained to support and supervise the R&S operation.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 5: (LTP) Brigade S2 products preparation.

PROBLEM: Brigade S2s often arrive at NTC having conducted little or no Home Station preparation of checklists or formatted charts.

RESULT: Brigade S2s are normally unable to provide timely support for the brigade planning process.

Techniques:

1. Recommend that each S2 section develop a SOP with a checklist and formatted charts.
 - a. The SOP should address the products that will be routinely required of the S2 section for each phase of the staff planning process as well as battle tracking.
 - b. These products would be based on standard requirements as well as staff and commander-driven requirements.
2. Recommend the following items be developed as part of the unit S2 Home Station preparation:
 - a. Terrain Analysis in the form of a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) and Intervisibility Line (IV) overlay
 - b. Light data chart
 - c. Doctrinal templates
 - d. S2 mission analysis and battle tracking charts.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 6: (LTP) S2 understanding of enemy tactics.

PROBLEM: Task force (TF) S2s are too often coming to LTP with a rudimentary knowledge of OPFOR composition and tactics.

RESULTS:

1. Planning processes are continually slowed down because of lengthy discussions on how the OPFOR fights.
2. Lack of a thorough knowledge of OPFOR doctrine has adversely affected battle tracking during execution because the S2s have difficulty trying to identify the “big picture.”

Technique: S2s should come to NTC with a comprehensive knowledge on how the OPFOR fights. (TRADOC Pam 350-16, Take Home Packages from previous rotations, CALL products and the OPFOR homepage are good starts).

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 7: (LTP) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) plan refinement.

PROBLEM: Although reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning is detailed and fundamentally sound at the task force (TF) level, TFs fail to follow-up with brigade on many R&S issues during the later stages of R&S planning and preparation.

- a. TFs seldom plan for air movement for the COLTs that were OPCON to them.
- b. TFs seldom plan for the employment of ground surveillance radar (GSR) in their zone.
- c. TFs still have difficulty with terrain management in their area of operation (AO). They often do not know exact locations of brigade assets in their AOs.

Technique: TFs should plan R&S operations as they would a combat operation with continuous refinement during planning, preparation, and execution.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 8: (LTP) Engineer involvement in reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.

PROBLEM: Engineer efforts in support of R&S is normally inadequate.

- a. The engineer battalion rarely plays a major part in the brigade's R&S planning.
- b. Proposed locations for the assets going forward, i.e., COLTs, scouts, C2, ADA, IEW etc., are not addressed by the engineers.
- c. A relationship between the assistant battalion engineer (ABE) and the R&S planning cell rarely occurs.
- d. When engineers accompany task force (TF) scouts or COLTs on a collection mission, they normally cross the forward line of own troops (FLOT) with minimal guidance.

Techniques:

1. The ABE should assertively participate as a key player during R&S planning.
2. Engineer terrain products should be produced that support the R&S plan.
3. During a deliberate attack especially, engineer specific NAIs should be developed and refined.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 9: Integration of Air Defense into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force (TF) staffs routinely omit or fail to integrate the air portion of the IPB during the TF planning process.
2. Most S2s integrate air avenues on the SITEMP, but few conduct a detailed air threat analysis.
3. The most likely COA for enemy air is rarely identified.

RESULTS:

1. The TF commander, staff, and company commanders gain little appreciation for the enemy air threat and capabilities.
2. Air defense plans are oriented on unit movement instead of concentrating available assets to defeat the air threat.
3. The TF commander's guidance to the air defense officers (ADOs) is unfocused (Example, ADA: protect the force).

Techniques:

1. The S2 should draw on the ADO for expertise on enemy air threat capabilities. Begin by referring to FM 34-130, Appendix C, reference the three dimensional IPB.
2. The air associated IPB cannot be treated separately. It must be used to show the synergy of air and ground threat.
3. During the mission analysis, the air threat must be briefed to the TF commander up front. This allows the commander to "see" critical points on the battlefield where the unit is most vulnerable to air attack. The commander can then prioritize ADA coverage IAW the threat and his intent/maneuver scheme. ADA assets will be positioned to defeat the air threat while the force postures to take active or passive air defense measures.
4. A standard 1:250,000 map should be used to conduct a detailed analysis of the terrain and refined using a 1:50,000 map.
5. The air IPB should include:

- a. Key Terrain:
 - Airfields
 - LAS and DZ
 - FARPs
 - Choke Points
- b. Air Avenues:
 - Type of Aircraft
 - Max Ceiling
 - Attack Profile
 - Weapon Systems
 - Target to be Attacked
- c. Weather:
 - Visibility
 - Wind Speed and Direction
 - Precipitation
 - Cloud Cover
 - Temperature
- d. Threat Evaluation:
 - Enemy Aircraft/Missile
 - Air Order of Battle
 - Aircraft Capabilities
 - Ordnance
- Tactical Flight Doctrine
- Priorities of Attack
- Command and Control
- e. Threat Integration:
 - SITEMP
 - Air Avenues of Approach
 - Determine best use terrain given aircrafts' own capabilities and attack profile.
- f. Event Template:
 - Aerial NAIs
 - Terrain constraints on air avenue to potential target
 - Decision Support Template
- g. Decision Support Template:
 - Air Avenues
 - Air Borne and Air Assault Objectives
 - LZs and DZs
 - Ranges of enemy systems
 - Aerial TAIs
 - Decision points

6. References: FM 34-130, IPB, Appendix C; FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations; FM 44-64, FAAD Battalion and Battery Operations; TRADOC PAM 350-16, Heavy OPFOR Doctrine.
 (TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 10: (LTP) Air Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Development.

PROBLEM: Air Defense Officers (ADO) have a tendency to wait until the brigade receives the formal order from Division before they begin the aerial IPB process. They rarely develop an aerial IPB based on the initial Warning Order (WARNO). Therefore, the brigade ADO rarely develops the aerial portion of the IPB prior to mission analysis.

RESULT: The ADA BOS rarely incorporates the third dimension analysis into the maneuver S2's IPB prior to COA development.

Procedures: The Aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the brigade will most likely see enemy air. Appendix A of FM 44-100, *Air Defense Operations*, specifically addresses the Aerial IPB process. It emphasizes that the aerial IPB is a time consuming process that is an integral part of the IPB process.

Techniques:

1. The ADO's development of the aerial portion of the IPB must begin immediately following receipt of the Division's Warning Order.
2. The Air (Aerial) IPB must be a part of the brigade combat team's (BCT's) enemy situational template (SITEMP).

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 11: (LTP) Brigade S2 maintenance of enemy Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).

PROBLEM: The tracking of enemy BDA consistently provides a challenge for brigade S2s.

- a. There is no system in place to track enemy losses as they are identified on the battlefield.
- b. There are routinely no dedicated OPs that can provide surveillance of the enemy forces during the battle.

RESULT: Without an accurate enemy BDA, the S2 cannot identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities as they develop as a result of the actions during the battle.

Techniques:

1. Recommend that S2s develop enemy BDA charts that reflect an enemy in the defense by platoon positions and in the offense by each component echelon of the attacking force, rather than gross numbers of combat systems.
2. The R&S plan must address the assets that have surveillance responsibility during the battle. These assets must be tracked and queried to provide updated combat information to include BDA.
3. The subordinate units that have the task of destroying a particular enemy element are also responsible for providing the disposition of the threat they are required to act upon.
4. Commanders must crosstalk on the command net, and S2s must crosstalk on the O&I net.

(TA.5.2.2.5 Conduct Post-Attack Target Damage Assessment)

TREND 12: Task Force (TF) S2 terrain analysis. TF S2s often inadequately analyze the terrain in sufficient detail.

PROBLEMS:

1. TF S2s accurately depict enemy avenues of approach (AA) into their sectors/zones; however, they are *not maximizing the MCOOs and other products* for terrain analysis.
2. S2s identify enemy kill sacks, potential friendly engagement areas, defensible terrain, and specific system and equipment locations but *do not integrate their product with the TF engineer*.
3. S2s do not routinely use the TERRA BASE products or the 1:24,000 scale maps.

RESULT: The commander and staff are denied opportunities to exploit the terrain when determining friendly and Threat COAs.

Techniques:

1. S2s should train to produce detailed terrain analysis using TERRA BASE products and 1:24,000 scale maps. Use of these products would allow the commander and staff to “see the terrain” in greater detail prior to mission execution.
2. S2s should guard against making general assumptions regarding the “open terrain” in the desert.
3. TF S2s must improve in their ability to articulate how the terrain will impact COAs. S2 use of terrain analysis during mission analysis and COA development would greatly improve both their and the S3 threat and friendly COAs products.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 13: (LTP) Engineer unit use of the Terra Base computer software program.

PROBLEMS:

1. Although FM 5-71-3 devotes an entire appendix (Appendix C) to the uses and capabilities of Terra Base, it is not routinely used at brigade or below.
2. Most engineer units are unfamiliar with the Terra Base computer program and use either “stubby pencil” line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams or completely ignore their “analysis of terrain” responsibility in the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) process.

Procedures:

1. Terrain analysis is an *engineer* responsibility.
2. Appendix C to FM 5-71-3 explains that Terra Base is a computer software program that aids in the analysis of terrain. It does the following:
 - a. Creates line-of-sight profiles.
 - b. Assesses placement locations for weapons, radar, and radios.
 - c. Views three-dimensional representations of terrain.

Technique: Terra Base or other terrain analysis tools should be required during Home Station training.

- a. Train key personnel.
- b. Identify the required brigade and task force products during Home Station training.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 14: Event templates and matrices.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force S2s are generally not producing their event template or event matrix.
2. Those that are produced are incomplete.
3. S2s do not understand the use of the event template or items incorporated on the event template.

RESULTS:

1. S2s do not include a friendly COA development product.
2. S2s omit the R&S Plan product.

Techniques:

1. TF S2s must learn the importance of the event template. They cannot delete this step from the planning process.
2. Read and comply with FM 34-130. Phase lines, NAIs, and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.
3. Use the event matrix as a companion to the template. Use of the event matrix should also help distinguish between the enemy COAs.
4. Conduct Home Station drills to develop the S2 section.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 15: Situation Templates (SITEMPs) for use in R&S Planning.

PROBLEMS:

1. SITEMPs are often not available during the R&S planning.
2. TFs are not able to distinguish between when infiltration is possible and when infiltration is required to achieve the recon objective.
3. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemy's commitment to counterrecon.
4. There is a lack of understanding of planning factors for recon.

RESULTS:

1. HMMWV scouts frequently selecting or being given routes right through enemy security zone positions.
2. The lack of understanding of planning factors for recon results in unrealistic expectations.

Techniques:

1. Dismounted infiltration is the only method that provides a reasonable probability of success when scouts are employed in this role. However, dismounted operations are also very limited in their scope and sustainability. More success is observed when OPFOR security forces are identified and destroyed, thereby opening a lane for the recon force to penetrate the enemy's security zone.
2. Bradley equipped scouts are better suited for these missions. HMMWV scouts must be either escorted or carried by Bradleys to a dismount point in order to be in position to observe the enemy's defensive preparation.
3. Integrate mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the recon force.
4. Availability and positioning of mortars and artillery must be a consideration in targeting enemy engineer and artillery assets.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 16: Task Force (TF) S2 development of enemy courses of action (COAs). TF S2s have difficulty developing complete enemy COAs to assist the commander and staff to visualize how the enemy will fight using combat multipliers and the terrain.

PROBLEMS:

1. Mission analysis is frequently rushed by the TF. S2s usually have the competence, but often do not have sufficient time to complete their products.
2. Very few S2s are able to develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models.
3. S2s too often do not incorporate all threat combat multipliers and the terrain in the enemy COA.

Techniques:

1. TF staffs must understand the importance of mission analysis.
2. Early coordination with the brigade S2 for receipt of the brigade SITEMP will allow more time to develop TF level threat COAs.
3. The TF S2 must use a checklist to cover all combat multipliers. SITEMP omission of enemy capabilities such as ADA, indirect fires, or engineers may cause the TF to encounter unexpected threat COAs during the battle.
4. S2 sections must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so that SITEMPs are produced quickly under battlefield conditions.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)

TREND 17: (LTP) S2 Situation template (SITEMP) adjustments.

PROBLEMS:

1. Initially, brigade S2 situational templates (SITEMPs) generally contain a comprehensive analysis of the threat and have multiple enemy courses of action. However, as more intelligence is provided to verify or deny a specific enemy course of action, the S2's adjusted situational templates usually lack the specificity.
2. Adjusted SITEMPs usually do not differentiate between actual (based on collected intelligence) versus templated enemy positions.

Techniques:

1. S2 sections should use a checklist that includes the different elements of the threat that the brigade will encounter. Such a checklist will ensure that each element is addressed. Recommend the following:

When facing a threat force, the S2's adjusted situational template should include the following components:	When facing an attacking threat, the following components of the attack should be included:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Divisional Reconnaissance - Regimental Reconnaissance - Artillery range fans - Ambush positions - Combat Security Out Posts - Nonpersistent chemical - Persistent chemical - FASCAM. MRC positions - Direct fire weapon positions - Direct fire range fans - Obstacles and the consequent fire sack created by those systems. - Dismounted infantry positions -Air defense weapons systems - RAGs/DAGs - Battalion reserve - Regimental Reserves - Routes for those reserves and timelines for the commitment of those reserves. - Air avenues of approach for fixed and rotary winged aircraft and firing positions or rotary winged aircraft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Divisional reconnaissance team positions (DRTs) - Regimental reconnaissance routes - Combat Reconnaissance Patrol routes - Forward Security Element axis - Advance Guard main body axis - Regimental main body axis - TF Angel objective - Task Force Destroyer objective - AT-5s position - RAG - Templated Nonpersistent and Persistent chemical strikes - Templated FASCAM - Air avenues of approach

2. The adjusted SITEMPs should differentiate between items that are confirmed from the Reconnaissance and Surveillance effort and those items that remain templated.

3. Recommend other brigade staff officers be given individual responsibilities to assist the S2's development of the SITEMP (i.e., the engineer should assist in templating obstacles, FASCAM, and the employment of a Mobile Obstacle Detachment/Mobile Support Detachment. The Chemical Officer should assist in templating Persistent and Nonpersistent strikes. The Air Defense Officer should assist in identifying the enemy air avenues of approach.)

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)

MANEUVER BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Heavy task force (TF) use of dismounted infantry.

PROBLEMS:

1. Heavy task forces (TFs) do not utilize their dismounted infantry.
2. Dismounted infantry are often not integrated into the scheme of maneuver.
3. Dismounted infantry lack a clear task and purpose in conjunction with the mounted elements.
4. When Heavy TFs are forced to use their dismounted infantry, the soldiers are often unprepared to accomplish their mission.
 - a. Soldiers are unclear of the tactical situation and how their task and purpose relates to the company's.
 - b. NCOs often leave behind or fail to functionally inspect essential equipment to accomplish their mission (graphics, radios, NVGs, binoculars, AT weapons, etc.).
5. Infantry units are often consolidated within the TF at the last minute, preventing any meaningful troop-leading procedures (orders, rehearsals, PCCs/PCIs).

Techniques:

1. Use the following capabilities of dismounted infantry to enhance lethality:
 - a. Surveillance (R&S plan and LP/OPs).
 - b. Reconnoiter (IVLs, security patrols, and LD).
 - c. Infiltration (seize key terrain, secure FO teams, covertly reduce obstacles, objective surveillance).
 - d. Execute defense (utilize infantry strong points to secure mounted flanks or contact patrols to adjacent company teams or TFs).
 - e. Construct obstacle (augment the TF engineers).
 - f. Perform anti-armor ambush (economy of force on separate AAs).
2. Use every possible opportunity during Home Station training to integrate the use of the mounted and dismounted elements.
 - a. Identify shortfalls in dismounted personnel and train as a consolidated force during Home Station training.
3. Identify dismounted missions early to enable units to task organize and properly prepare and rehearse for their mission.

(T.A.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment))

TREND 2: Engagement area development. The overall goal of attack helicopter operations is to destroy enemy formations in a given engagement area. To accomplish this goal the battalion staff must understand and exercise the eight step engagement area development process (FM 1-112, chapter 3).

PROBLEMS:

1. Units commonly fail to conduct appropriate IPB which causes the attack unit to “miss” the enemy in the indicated engagement area.
2. Units commonly fail to properly integrate the massed effects of direct fire systems with other battlefield operating systems (BOS) in the engagement area.

RESULT: The effectiveness of the attack helicopter unit is significantly reduced.

Techniques:

1. The resources expended and risks associated with attack helicopter operations are substantial. From deep attacks behind a mature enemy front line trace (EFLT) to attacks against 1st Echelon forces in the main battle area (MBA), *success is based on detailed planning and development of the engagement area.*

2. Although the process involves eight steps, the following paragraphs highlight two steps which are commonly neglected.

a. **STEP 1 - IPB:** The S2 begins the process of IPB given primary and alternate engagement areas.

1) The S2 should concentrate, initially, on answering the following five questions, which, when answered, will yield the enemy's most probable COA:

- Where is the enemy currently located?
- Where is the enemy going?
- Where can we best engage the enemy?
- When will the enemy be there?
- What weapons systems does the enemy have that can affect the unit?

2) It is imperative that the S2 provide the best prediction possible of where the enemy will go. This provides focus for planning and should lead to a primary COA with branches.

3) The S2 must also predict how the formation will look (i.e., number of vehicles, types of formations, march speeds, etc.) during movement through NAIs and on arrival at the engagement area.

4) Finally, the S2 must predict how the enemy will react at TAIs and under direct fire in the engagement area. The S2 provides a description of these reactions (in detail) while wargaming integration of the engagement area.

5) Upon determination of where the unit should attack the enemy, the S2 must determine quickly the collection assets that are available. The S2 considers the following:

- Sensor capabilities (accuracy, required redundancy, etc.).
- Higher's collection plan and priorities for sensors.

-- Sensor scheduling (Do the JSTARS, UAV, SOF, etc., schedules coincide with the attack unit's requirement for coverage?)

-- Is there real-time down link to the requesting unit?

-- Is there overlapping coverage on critical NAIs, and do we have the capability to shift sensor orientation as the formation proceeds to subsequent NAIs?

- Where is the intel handover line (where will higher handover the NAI tracking responsibility to the attack unit - this is critical in determining scheme of maneuver).

- Do the NAIs support Redcon level upgrades?

-- Do the NAIs support time/distance requirements from the AA/HA to initial ABF positions?

-- Are NAIs covered by ground maneuver brigade assets, and, if so, do we have appropriate links?

6) Answers to these considerations allow the S2 to establish a realistic decision support template for employment of the attack battalion.

b. **STEP 2 - Integration of the engagement area:** In short, adequate integration of the engagement area ensures all available BOS assets are considered and employed to ensure maximum destruction of the enemy formation at a given engagement area.

1) **Intelligence:** As discussed earlier, the S2 must provide accurate predictions of how the enemy formation will look when it enters the engagement area. The S2 must be prepared to present enemy actions during the staff's wargame of events at the engagement area:

- Rates of march (how long the enemy will be visible).
- Key terrain (that affords the enemy advantages for specific avenues of approach).
- When and how the enemy will conduct counter-engagements.
- When and where indirect fire can affect ABFs.
- Where the dead space is in the engagement area.

2) **Maneuver:** The battalion S3 determines where and when direct fire systems can best be used against the enemy formation the S2 describes.

- The S3 establishes initial ABFs at a primary weapon range (i.e., Hellfire missile) that will ensure a 75% probability of hit (Ph).

- The S3 must consider alternate and subsequent ABFs in the objective area.

- If ground maneuver forces are attached or OPCON and will attack into the same engagement area as air maneuver forces, then the S3 must consider fire distribution and deconfliction of fire between the two forces.

- Finally, the S2 and S3 wargame friendly actions versus enemy reactions and determine where in the engagement area artillery, CAS, mortars, obstacles etc., are needed to shape the battlespace for the direct fire fight.

3) **Following the wargame:** The following questions must be considered:

- What is the end state of the indirect fire plan?
- How much artillery/CAS/mortars are available for employment in the engagement area?
- Who will initiate fires?
- How will the unit shift fires?
- Who will clear fires once the direct fire fight begins?

4) **Additional considerations:** The staff must also consider and integrate the company commander's direct fire plan from given ABFs and the effects of obscurants in the engagement areas.

5) **Extended range deep attacks:** Employment of joint nonlethal EW may be the only direct fire complement to the extended range engagement area. Commo and radar jamming can be very effective in and around the engagement area particularly during ingress to initial ABFs and attack of critical ADA targets and in support of movement to subsequent ABFs.

3. Attack battalion staffs should practice wargaming given engagement areas using large scale terrain models.

a. The FSO should be a participant during the wargaming so he can provide answers early for what indirect fires can and cannot do.

b. After the unit feels comfortable with the general concept on a terrain model, they should practice on cartoon sketches which represent terrain, ABFs, enemy formations, etc.

c. As an end state, the staff should be able to wargame the engagement area using a 1:50,000 map.

d. While practicing the wargame technique, the staff should record techniques that work best.

4. The S2 should keep a battle book of sensor capabilities and enemy orders of battle to expedite the IPB process.

5. The FSO should record potential essential fire support tasks that become evident during practice engagement area wargaming.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 3: Company/team maneuver at the objective.

PROBLEMS:

1. Battalions and company/teams frequently occupy their initial attack-by-fire (ABF) positions at their primary engagement area and do not continue to maneuver to engage the enemy. If the enemy is not exactly where the attacking unit predicted or if the timing is incorrect, the attacking unit may not see the enemy from their initial positions.

2. When company/teams *do* encounter the enemy where predicted and begin the engagement, they typically do not maneuver to maintain contact and maintain security of the ABF position.

Techniques:

WHEN THE ENEMY IS NOT WHERE PREDICTED:

1. During initial planning, the S2 must determine an intelligence handover line (IHL) where the executing unit becomes responsible for overwatch of NAIs that lead into the primary engagement area. The executing unit pushes recon assets forward which provide final guidance to attack assets.

EXAMPLE: NAI 200 is the intelligence handover line (IHL).

a. The enemy is located at NAI 200 IAW the S2's decision support template (DST). The commander decides to attack with the battalion led by recon assets to the primary engagement area.

b. The recon asset acquires the enemy at NAI 201 and confirms the main body should attack into the primary engagement area.

2. The S2 must determine early on if sensor capability, availability, and down link provide the capability to perform a precision/max destruction attack. If this capability does not exist, then the attack unit prepares to conduct movement to contact to find and destroy the enemy in a given zone. The staff determines triggers for execution of alternate engagement areas and alternate schemes of maneuver.

EXAMPLE: Collection breakdown at NAI 200.

a. Commander decides to maneuver to the primary engagement area and occupy initial attack-by-fire positions.

b. The battalion occupies initial attack-by-fire positions and does not locate the enemy.

c. After a specified time in the initial attack-by-fire positions (as determined by the staff during COA wargaming), the battalion begins to execute one of two maneuver methods:

- a *movement to contact* to locate and destroy the enemy, or
- *bounding to subsequent attack-by-fire positions* which correspond to alternate engagement areas.

Both methods are effective. Available time, type of terrain, and enemy situation determine the method to use -- or perhaps a combination of the two methods.

3. Regardless the method used, ***battalions must plan to maneuver at the objective area***. Even with perfect intelligence, our planned attack-by-fire positions may not accommodate destruction of the enemy. Battalions must be prepared to maneuver to subsequent/alternate attack-by-fire positions to initiate or continue the attack.

4. Establish triggers for this movement.

5. Conduct rehearsals.

WHEN THE ATTACK UNIT BEGINS THE ENGAGEMENT, THEY THEN MUST MANEUVER TO DESTROY THE ENEMY:

1. The staff must wargame the attack unit's actions and the enemy reactions during integration of the engagement area.

a. The wargaming process ensures appropriate integration of indirect fire systems, direct fire systems and countermobility.

b. The S2 must disseminate expected OPFOR actions to the company commanders.

2. Company commanders should attend the wargaming session to enhance their knowledge of the overall engagement area plan and how the enemy is expected to react. Through this process, the S3, S2, fire support officer (FSO), and company commanders begin to visualize how the enemy will react, and can develop plans to maintain contact and shift fires to destroy the enemy.

a. The company commander leaves the wargame session with a plan to maneuver his company to ensure mission success.

b. The battalion S3 leaves the wargame session prepared to maneuver the battalion to ensure mission success.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 4: (LTP) Establishment of support-by-fire (SBF) positions.

PROBLEM: Task forces (TFs) have difficulty synchronizing the establishment of support-by-fire (SBF) positions.

a. Company/teams are given inadequate clarification of the SBF purpose and associated tasks. They continually assume they have a “destroy” mission when, in actuality, a fix or suppress mission may accomplish the purpose of the SBF.

b. TF staffs do not accomplish a detailed terrain analysis of the planned SBF position and generally establish an SBF within the enemy “kill sack.”

c. Token consideration is given to the effects of weather, enemy disposition, and the need to establish conditions prior to occupying the SBF.

d. Effective triggers, assault positions, and observation points are not planned, and, if planned, usually ignored during execution.

e. Smoke plans are rarely made, and coordination of the targeting process between fire support and maneuver does not occur.

f. TF mortars are given the task of obscuring an enemy position in order to permit occupation of the SBF. Even with 120mm mortars it is difficult for a mortar platoon to initiate and maintain a smoke screen of any significant size.

RESULT: Inability to establish an effective SBF will normally result in the breach and assault force not accomplishing their mission. The rapid demise of the SBF element gives the enemy freedom to reposition at will.

Procedure: FM 71-123 does not adequately address the SBF mission. There is only one short page on this subject, letting the reader conclude that the SBF mission is a simple task that needs little emphasis. This doctrinal reference should be expanded to thoroughly address the importance of establishing and executing an effective SBF.

Techniques:

1. TF commanders and staffs must realize the criticality of the SBF mission.
 - a. A thorough threat and terrain analysis must be conducted to support the SBF.
 - b. The staff should conduct a detailed wargame of the SBF mission.
2. Early in the planning process, establish a clear purpose for the SBF and assign specific tasks to support that purpose.
3. Require the S2/BICC and staff to complete a detailed threat and terrain analysis. Advantages and disadvantages of key and/or decisive terrain must be recognized and integrated into the wargaming.
 - a. Make maximum use of Terra Base.
 - b. Identify multiple enemy COAs, to include the use of his combat multipliers.
 - c. If possible, conduct a physical recon of the area.
4. Establish criteria, decision points, triggers, and conditions during wargaming that will synchronize the establishment of the SBF. Anticipated enemy events must be included in the wargaming.
5. Develop an observation plan to execute the planned synchronization. Ensure the SBF position is not occupied until it has been reconnoitered and observation is conducted on the enemy position to be suppressed, fixed, or destroyed.
6. The TF fire support officer (FSO) should plan fires to cover the positioning of the SBF force.
 - a. He must clearly define the essential fires support tasks associated with the SBF.
 - b. He must understand the capabilities of each fire support asset and then translate that into a realistic fire support execution matrix. The matrix must clearly define task and purpose of fires and address the “decide-detect-deliver-assess” aspects as related to the scheme of maneuver.
 - c. As always, fire support wargaming is critical.
7. Priority of fires should be given to the SBF force until their task/purpose is accomplished. The SBF commander should be the responsible leader for determining when fires can be shifted to support the breach force. A technique is to position the TF commander in a position where he can make that assessment.
8. Smoke plans should be developed by the S3, FSO and Chem-O to support maneuver into and occupation of the SBF. The plan must address all types of smoke, to include FA, mortar, vehicle generated and smoke pots.
9. Threat COAs must be continually updated and disseminated on the command net by the S2 based upon gathered intelligence.
 - a. Information must be rapidly analyzed and disseminated to all elements but immediately to the SBF force.
 - b. Staffs should be skilled in visualizing the battlefield and capable of completing a predictive analysis.
10. Operational control graphics must be developed to permit flexibility. Decision points should be developed to support occupation of multiple SBFs.
11. TF commanders should require detailed rehearsals by the SBF force and elements in support. A complete understanding by everyone of tasks and purpose is critical by the end of the rehearsal.
12. TF TOCs should closely track the success or failure of the SBF force. That success or failure should be associated with a decision point to continue as planned or to execute other branches or COAs.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 5: Company/team use of direct fires during offensive missions.

PROBLEMS:

1. In the offense, company/team commanders seldom conduct advanced planning for the use of direct fires during maneuver.

2. Commanders have only graphic control measures to control fires.

RESULT: Commanders must attempt to execute supporting fire while in contact.

Techniques:

1. The focus of offensive fires is to control and distribute those fires while on the move against a generally static enemy. Company/team commanders must have an offensive fire plan to maximize the principles of direct fire and allow the commander to focus, distribute and shift fires (see FM 71-1, Chap 2&3; FM 17-12-1/2; FM 23-1; CALL Special Edition 98-x "Closing With The Enemy" and SH 7-45, available through the CALL homepage).

2. Company/team commanders can control offensive direct fires with the same tools that are used in the defense:

- a. engagement areas (EAs)
- b. target reference points (TRPs)
- c. fire patterns
- d. fire commands

3. The offensive fire plan should provide the company/team commander the ability to orient his force and transition it from a moving force to a base of fire and maneuver.

a. There are several techniques that can assist the commander in planning and controlling his direct fires, including:

- Sectors
- Quadrants
- Target Array
- Closest TRP
- Fire Patterns
- Grids

b. The first four techniques use TRPs to control fires.

- TRPs assist in focusing fires on a point, on multiple points, or an area.
- They may be oriented on either enemy or terrain.
- They are preplanned to support the scheme of maneuver.
- Some TRPs are planned on enemy positions or surrounding terrain to focus platoon fires against the enemy.

Others are planned on terrain features throughout the zone of attack. This allows flexibility controlling fires if the actual enemy disposition does not match the SITEMP, or in the event of chance contact.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 6: Company direct fire planning.

PROBLEMS:

1. Company commanders tend to lack understanding of where and when direct fire planning occurs in the battalion engagement area development process.

2. Company commanders seldom synchronize the direct fire plans from among the companies within a battalion engagement area.

Techniques:

1. The battalion S3 or battalion commander conducts a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) with the entire staff and company commanders, working through the battalion engagement area development process. At the end of the exercise, company commanders should know:

- a. where direct fire planning occurs in the process.
- b. what battalion warning orders (WARNOs) will initiate the company direct fire. planning, products and resources the companies should expect from battalion.
- c. what products the company should produce for a complete direct fire plan.

Eight steps of engagement area development

Direct fire planning principles

Battalion

Company

IPB

Mass fires

Select the ground for the attack

Focus fires

Integration of the engagement area

Distribute fires

Plan the direct fire fight

Shift fires

Fire commands

Leaders control fires

Review the plan

All crews know the plan

Rehearse

Rehearse the fire plan

Execute

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 7: Company shifting of direct fires.

PROBLEM: Commanders do not plan or execute shifting of fires to:

- allow a team that is decisively engaged to maneuver and maintain standoff; or
- focus fires on critical enemy weapons systems or enemy concentrations.

Techniques:

1. Commanders must plan and rehearse *critical events* that would require a fire command to shift fires.

EXAMPLES:

- a. Enemy closing within direct fire engagement range of a firing team.
- b. Enemy forces selecting a COA that changes the initial fire distribution plan.
- c. Enemy rate of march that exceeds friendly ability to destroy all targets from initial set positions.
2. Companies should conduct tactical chalk talks or walk-through drills where they outline the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) they will use to shift fires during the direct fire fight.
 - a. Incorporate these TTPs into team and platoon battle drills and validate them during company situational training exercises.
 - b. Capture validated TTPs in a company SOP or battle book.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 8: Maneuver unit understanding of enemy engagement areas and actions on the objective.

PROBLEMS:


1. Company/team commanders have difficulty providing graphic representation of enemy engagement areas to their platoons.
2. The company/team is normally still moving on the battlefield when they receive first contact from the enemy main body.

RESULTS:

1. There is an immediate breakdown in command and control as individual vehicles and platoons begin to react to contact from the march.
2. Once the commander and platoon leaders regain control of their elements, the company has been fixed, loses combat power, and is unable to accomplish its mission.

Techniques:

1. The unit commander must paint the picture for his subordinates! He must build a *mental* and *physical* picture of the enemy's battlespace/engagement area (or "red zone") beginning in the planning phase.
 - a. He develops and refines the actual location of vehicles and enemy positions from reports prior to crossing the LD.
 - b. *He must transmit these updates with graphics and FRAGOs to subordinates.*
2. Plan. The commander combines the range arcs of all potential enemy locations and designates the enemy's kill-sack during the development of his order.
 - a. He refines the S2's Threat COA:
 - plans for visual contact and when and where it will occur
 - plans the ranges from likely security zone locations
 - plans likely locations for enemy air and NBC agents to be used
 - b. He analyzes his portion of the fight and begins building maneuver transition locations (probable lines of deployment, checkpoints, or phase lines). These will aid in the deployment of his force from the march.
 - c. The commander then focuses on actions on the objective from this line into the enemy rear or to the LOA.
3. Prepare. *Rehearse the transition from **movement** to the company/team **maneuver*** (platoons in overwatch; platoons bounding) and then analyze terrain in depth to determine where advantage over the enemy can be gained.
 - a. The company will already be within direct fire range and must act independently; its platoons must maneuver without excessive guidance once they reach the enemy "red zone" (the "red zone" fight equals actions on the objective). Plan for enemy air and artillery to attrit the company.
 - b. Rehearse several approaches as contingencies tied to decision points and what criteria would cause the plan to change.
 - c. Ensure the plan is rehearsed on a very detailed terrain board and then reinforced, time permitting, with a key leader rehearsal or full rehearsal (see CALL Newsletter 98-x, Rehearsals).
4. Execute.
 - a. Prior to LD, with all reported enemy locations and disposition at his disposal, the commander releases a final graphic, using actual enemy positions to represent the "red zone" (see example below).
 - b. He issues a FRAGO with any last instructions, and selects the company maneuver transition point. This may be a location of the last covered and concealed spot prior to the enemy's "red zone," or a criteria (i.e., two or more tanks engage lead platoon).
 - c. Once in the enemy's "red zone," all platoons move deliberately but with coordination conducted over company radio net to ensure maximum, focused firepower.
 - d. The commander deconflicts maneuver space with adjacent companies.
 - e. The XO reports situation to the task force (TF).



Sample enemy "red zone" graphic.
The company/team maneuver and actions on the objective begin just beyond
where the enemy main body can influence the unit.

(TA.1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat)

TREND 9: Integration of direct fire with maneuver.

PROBLEM: Company commanders do not effectively tie direct fire planning to the maneuver plan.

Techniques:

1. Once the battalion has selected the engagement area, companies must determine where they will fight from and how they will focus, distribute and shift fires.
2. Company commanders must know how the enemy plans to maneuver in the engagement area and what the most likely enemy courses of action (COAs) are so that they may plan the direct fire fight to cover all possible contingencies.
3. Company commanders must tie direct fire planning to the maneuver plan. Commanders must be able to answer the five rules of IPB:
 - a. Where is the enemy?
 - b. Where is he going?
 - c. Where do we want to kill him?
 - d. When will he be there?
 - e. What does he have that can hurt me?
4. Commanders must determine how they will maneuver to maintain standoff and keep the enemy at a disadvantage.
5. Commanders must determine how to react to the enemy's actions to maintain initiative.
6. Companies should conduct tactical chalk talks or walk-through drills where they outline the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) they will use to maneuver while executing the direct fire fight.
 - a. Incorporate these TTPs into team and platoon battle drills and validate them in company situational training exercises.
 - b. Capture validated TTPs in a company SOP or battle book.

(TA.1.4 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver)

TREND 10: (LTP) Synchronization of supporting fires.

PROBLEM: Task forces (TFs) are not conducting sufficient planning in the integration of fires into the scheme of maneuver.

- a. During wargaming, fire support officers (FSOs) do not understand the scheme of maneuver and what fires are necessary, given the constraints, to support the maneuver plan.
- b. TF FSOs are planning the use of fires without a thorough knowledge of the critical fire support tasks.
- c. When a TF has priority of fires, it does not maximize the use of fires, and fires do not have a significant impact during the execution.

Techniques:

1. Task force FSOs need a better understanding of how artillery is being used in the brigade's fight.
2. Task force FSOs should articulate the use of artillery by the BCT to the TF staff during course of action (COA) development and wargaming. This would provide them a better understanding of what close support assets can do to support the TF scheme of maneuver.

(TA.1.4 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver)

TREND 11: (LTP) Task force (TF) integration of heavy and light forces.

PROBLEM: Light task forces (TFs) are having difficulty integrating OPCON heavy units into their scheme of maneuver.

- a. Operations graphics do not support heavy force maneuver.
- b. Light TF staffs generally do not understand heavy forces' capabilities and limitations.
- c. Heavy company team commanders do not receive clear and defined tasks and purposes.

Technique: Light TF staffs should include the heavy force commander or a heavy force LNO in the planning process.

(TA.1.4 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Fire Support Observation Plan. Observation plans very often lack sufficient detail to provide the company fire support team (FIST) a focus for planning, preparing, or executing their mission.

Technique: The observation plan, as an integral part of the fire support plan, should provide the task and purpose for each observer by phase of the operation. As part of the scheme of fires worksheet, the following format may be useful:

FIRE SUPPORT OBSERVATION PLAN

	PHASE 1	PHASE 2
FS EVENT		
Task		
Purpose		
Trigger		
Observer		
Method		
Remarks		

This focus enables the company FIST to plan, conduct appropriate pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCI), and execute their mission according to the task force (TF) commander's intent.

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 2: Assignment of reconnaissance objectives for aviation assets.

PROBLEM: Aviation assets are often assigned high-risk, low-payoff reconnaissance objectives such as dug-in divisional reconnaissance team (DRT) positions and Combat Security Outposts (CSOPs), which are also often collocated with SA-14/SA-2-18 systems.

RESULT: Aviation assets are quickly attrited and are not available for high-payoff objectives that are crucial for overall mission success.

Techniques:

1. Aviation elements must be directly involved in the planning process early so proper and high-payoff reconnaissance objectives can be assigned for aviation assets.
2. Aviation elements should be assigned recon objectives which are susceptible to aviation's maneuverability, flexibility, and target acquisition capabilities (e.g., lasing for PGM strikes).
3. Aviation objectives should be high-payoff targets that are crucial for overall mission success.

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 3: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicles (BSFVs) in ground support role.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a misconception that BSFVs do not fire in a ground support role.
2. Some units opted not to give 25mm and 7.62mm ammunition to BSFV crews during live fire missions and assigned them low priority during force-on-force operations.

Techniques:

1. BSFV platoons can execute ground support missions using their 25mm and TOW as offensive weapons. BSFV crews that were given ammunition became significant combat multipliers.
2. When BSFVs are in direct support (DS) of a particular unit, that unit commander assigns the BSFV mission and position. Consistent with mission authority, the commander should issue guidance for use of BSFVs in the direct fire role.
3. Before the commander employs BSFVs in such a role he should consider:
 - a. Unit training.
 - b. Ammunition and equipment availability.
 - c. Availability for future air defense missions.
4. Reference: FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 4: (LTP) Fire Support integration.

PROBLEM: The brigade fire support element (FSE) and the brigade staff have a difficult time integrating fires with maneuver.

- a. Fires are normally planned *after* and not concurrently with the other BOS during the planning process.
- b. This problem begins with mission analysis and continues through COA development, wargaming, and rehearsals.

Technique: Develop FSE battle drills that ensure the following results occur in each phase.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING:

<u>Step</u>	<u>Results</u>
Mission Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- HVTs by critical events<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Fire support capabilities- Impact of IPB, TVA, and battlefield geometry on fire support- Recommend tasks for fire support
Commander's guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Task: formation, function, effect<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Purpose: How task contributes to our success- Nominated HPTs
COA Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Concept of fires<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Tentative PSNs, triggers, and FSCMs- Tentative R&S/observer plan and attack system- Nominated HPTs
Wargame	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Detailed scheme of fires- Clear sequence of FS events- Final triggers, PSNs, FSCMs, observer plan, attack system, and volume- HPTs defined clearly
Rehearsal	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Synchronized execution- Deconflict FA PSNs and movement- Ensure understanding of scheme- Practice branches and sequels

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

AIR DEFENSE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Directed early warnings during air defense operations.

PROBLEM: Directed early warnings are not rebroadcast in a timely manner to soldier/crew levels.

- a. Breakdowns begin at task force (TF) level because there is no ADA representative in the TF TOC during the battle (the ADO fights from his BSFV).
- b. Breakdowns continue when company commanders do not explain their active or passive air defense measures during rehearsals.
- c. The breakdown is complete when the soldiers do not hear or understand the directed early warning.

RESULT: Inadequate rebroadcast of directed early warning reduces the unit's ability to take active or passive measures, resulting in unnecessary attrition to enemy CAS or Hinds.

Techniques:

1. Early warning continues to be the pivotal factor during air defense operations.
 - a. Directed early warning is designed to alert a particular unit, units, or area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is passed over unit command net or nets designated by the unit as flash precedent traffic.
 - b. Directed early warning defines the local air defense warning (LADW), gives aircraft status (friendly, hostile or unknown), and identifies the approaching cardinal direction.
2. Commanders must ensure that directed early warnings are rebroadcast immediately down to soldier/crew levels.
3. Commanders must ensure that soldiers understand and act on directed early warnings.
 - a. Air defense operations should be addressed in the unit TACSOP.
 - b. Cover, concealment and dispersion are key to successful passive air defense measures.
- c. Any successful air defense plan must include the consideration of Combined Arms for Air Defense (CAFADS).
4. Company level actions to defeat the air threat include a CAFADS plan, the use of air guards, and engagement techniques to achieve the following:
 - a. Destroy the threat.
 - b. Force the threat away from friendly positions.
 - c. Force the threat to fly higher.
 - d. Spoil the hostile pilot's aim.

5. References: FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations; FM 44-64, FAAD Battalion and Battery Operations.

(TA.3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

TREND 2: Establishing air defense artillery (ADA) priorities.

PROBLEM: Units are not establishing air defense priorities during NTC rotations.

RESULT: STINGERS are usually allocated piecemeal instead of being positioned to provide mass at critical points and times on the battlefield.

Techniques:

1. Defining ADA priorities of protection and integrating that information with the air IPB will facilitate the allocation and positioning of ADA assets.
 - a. The air defense officer (ADO) develops and recommends air defense priorities to the supported commander in concert with the IPB and the supported commander's intent.
 - b. The commander approves or refocuses those priorities.
2. The ADO must have considered *criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat* (CVRT) as defined below:
 - a. *Criticality*: The degree to which an asset or force is essential to mission accomplishment.
 - b. *Vulnerability*: The degree to which an asset or force is susceptible to surveillance and attack or to damage if attacked.
 - c. *Recuperability*: The degree to which an asset or force can recover from inflicted damage to continue its mission.
 - d. *Threat*: The probability an asset or force will be targeted by enemy air.
3. Often BSFV are positioned with company/teams with little consideration of CVRT. When using these factors, the ADO must determine what is most important to the commander and weight that factor. *Priorities should be made specific to an area or unit.*

EXAMPLE: Prioritizing maneuver is too general and would not provide the needed focus. Using CVRT, the ADO can assist the commander in allocating ADA assets to the force. The commander should determine which factor is most important for the operation and apply weights to the factors of CVRT and integrate them into the unit TACSOP
4. Incorporate air defense doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), ADA principles, and ADA employment guidelines in Home Station training.
5. References: FM 44-100, *Air Defense Operations*.

(TA.3.3 Integrate Air Defense Fires)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Design and integration of obstacles.

PROBLEMS:

1. Obstacle groups typically lack density and integration with direct and indirect fires.
2. During the defense, many assistant task force (TF) engineers (A/TFE) do not develop a complete Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA). The EBA usually focuses on friendly engineer capabilities, often omitting the impact of terrain or the enemy breaching capability.
3. While the TF commander's intent is understood, the A/TFE does not develop an obstacle group design based on the resource planning factors and the width of the avenue of approach (AA).
4. Obstacles are not designed to defeat enemy breaching assets. Designs do not use combinations of "more-visible" and "unseen" obstacles in each group to manipulate the enemy's maneuver in the desired direction.
5. The A/TFE's countermobility timeline does not consider emplacing obstacles during the day versus night based on enemy recon in sector.
6. Many TFs do not array obstacles with sufficient depth.
7. The company/team fire plans do not effectively integrate direct and indirect fires to support the obstacle group design.


RESULTS:

1. Obstacles are rapidly bypassed or reduced by enemy engineers.
2. The TF does not achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, or BLOCK on the enemy formation.

Techniques:

1. Tactical obstacle design should be based on the formation of the attacking enemy and intended obstacle effect.
2. Initial design and array of each obstacle group should incorporate the commander's intent, the resource planning factor (RF), and the total width of the AA.
3. Determine the total quantity of standard minefields required to achieve the intended effect using the obstacle group design calculation shown below. Other anti-vehicular obstacles such as AT ditch or 11-row concertina roadblock can substitute for up to 20% of the standard minefields in a group. Situational obstacles such as VOLCANO, MOPMS, or ADAMS-RAAMS can be planned as part of the groups or used to reinforce an AA based on a new threat. By understanding the task and purpose of fires for each obstacle group design, all units can achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, TURN, FIX, or BLOCK on the enemy's formation.

STANDARD MINEFIELDS: A KEY COMPONENT OF OBSTACLE GROUP DESIGN



OBSTACLE GROUP DESIGN CALCULATION:


$$\# \text{ STANDARD MINEFIELDS} = \frac{(\text{TTL WIDTH OF AA}) \times (\text{RESOURCE FACTOR})}{(\text{STANDARD MINEFIELD FRONTAGE})}$$

OBSTACLE EFFECT	RESOURCE FACTOR	STANDARD MF FRONTAGE
DISRUPT	0.5	250m
FIX	1.0	250m
TURN	1.2	500m
BLOCK	2.4	500m

INTEGRATION OF FIRES AND OBSTACLE EFFECT

- DISRUPT GROUP** - BREAKS UP ENEMY FORMATION AND TEMPO.
- FORCES ENEMY TO DEPLOY AND BREACH EARLY.
 - SLOWS PART OF ENEMY FORMATION AND FRAGMENTS C3.
 - ALLOWS PART OF ENEMY TO BYPASS PIECEMEAL INTO MAIN ENGAGEMENT AREA.
 - SHALLOW OBSTACLES NOT VISIBLE AT LONG RANGE BUT SHOULD BE EASILY BYPASSED AS ENEMY NEARS.


RF = .5
SF = 250m



BLOCK GROUP- MASSES FIRES / OBSTACLES TO STOP ENEMY ATTACK ALONG SPECIFIC AA OR TO PREVENT ENEMY FROM PASSING THRU AN E

- NO BYPASS AVAILABLE; THE EA MUST COVER THE ENTIRE AA.
- HIGH VOLUME OF INTERLOCKING FIRES ACROSS THE ENTIRE AA.
- BLOCK OBSTACLES MUST DEFEAT ENEMY BREACHING EFFORT.
- GROUP CONSISTS OF COMPLEX OBSTACLES WHICH REQUIRE MUPLTIPLE BREACHING TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE A LANE.
- INCORPORATES BOTH "VISIBLE" AND "UNSEEN" OBSTACLES TO DISCOURAGE BREACHING.
- BLOCK OBSTACLES DO NOT STOP AN ENEMY ATTACK BY THEMSELVES: THEY MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH INTENSE FIRES

RF = 2.4
SF = 500m



(TA.6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles)

TREND 2: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) area security.

PROBLEMS:

1. UMCPs routinely do not establish basic security, from initial occupation of the UMCP through construction of individual fighting positions.
2. There is little uniformity in the way UMCPs occupy or establish their area.
3. Individual soldiers are rarely oriented on defensive positions or where each individual goes when directed to defend.

Techniques:

1. BMOs must develop SOPs that provide for security while moving and halted.
2. UMCPs must rehearse occupation of the UMCP area.
3. UMCP NCOs must utilize all available personnel and equipment at the UMCP for security.
4. *M1/M2 crews* waiting on vehicle repairs should be assigned security duties by the UMCP NCOIC while the mechanics work on their vehicle:
 - a. Dig in UMCP fighting positions.
 - b. Take an active role in the UMCP security plan.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 3: Security in the field trains.

PROBLEM: Field trains security plans are inadequate.

- Field trains security is not planned and integrated within the brigade support area (BSA).
- Units generally do not address security in the priorities of work when establishing the field trains as part of the BSA.
- The security plan is not developed, disseminated, or rehearsed.

Techniques:

1. The HHC commander, 1SG, and XO must take a proactive role in establishing field trains security.
2. The security plan must be coordinated with the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and integrated into the BSA defense plan.
3. Security of the field trains must be addressed in the unit's priorities of work.
4. Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) must be executed by the field trains leadership.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 4: (LTP) Brigade fratricide risks during brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) is poorly supervised by the S3.
2. Too many brigades view the R&S effort as a secondary or separate planning effort.
3. Brigades can have 15 to 20 soldiers infiltrating or air inserted throughout the depth of the brigade's area of operations. Task force (TF) scouts can add an additional 20 to 30 soldiers operating in the same general areas.
4. Brigade S3 sections seldom practice battle space management.

RESULTS:

1. Poor supervision of the brigade's R&S effort exposes our soldiers to high-risk, friendly fire conditions.
2. Brigades expose their scouts, COLTs, and ETACs to potential fratricide incidents.
3. Every unknown, unsupervised, or poorly-planned insertion of a surveillance asset exponentially increases the potential for disaster.

Techniques: R&S efforts are operational missions and intrinsically high-risk in nature. R&S planning and execution requires the knowledge, experience, and supervision of the primary maneuver BOS representative.

- a. R&S plans should not be a separate planning effort.
 - Use WARNOs and FRAGOs to get tasks and coordinating instructions out early to subordinate units. This will allow the unit maximum parallel planning time.

- If a separate R&S order is published, then the R&S order should be incorporated into the brigade's base order as one of the first phases of the OPORD.

b. As with all maneuver operations, develop and issue graphics, adequate control measures, and unit locations to all subordinate units involved in the operation.

c. Brigade and subordinate units must exchange their plans and graphics and ensure assigned soldiers are instructed in higher and adjacent unit activities and locations of other units operating in their areas.

d. The brigade operations section must review subordinate plans and identify potential BOS problems supporting the operation. Deconflict C2 and maneuver problems and notify BOS representatives of CS and CSS problems. The operations section must follow up on BOS representative solutions to problem areas.

e. The brigade operations section must practice battle space management. Current operations section must track current unit movement, activities, and locations and provide FSE accurate information to clear fires.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 5: Integration of air and ground operations during security missions.

PROBLEMS:

1. The aviation unit's friendly situational awareness of the ground maneuver elements is usually lacking, particularly the front line ground trace, COLT and scout locations, and artillery firing positions.
2. Ground observation plans and aviation observation plans are not integrated or synchronized to enhance each other's capabilities and provide mutually supporting OP positions.
3. The aviation limit of advance (LOA) is often tied to the ground maneuver LOA, which limits aviation's early warning capability.
4. Although aviation usually makes first contact with enemy forces in security missions, they seldom have priority of fires.
5. The ground commander too often fails to identify the decisive point for his engagement, causing aviation forces to piecemeal their assets to meet the continuous security requirements defined by the ground maneuver commander.

Techniques:

1. Early direct involvement in the planning process along with joint rehearsals will correct the friendly situational awareness issue.
2. Aviation units should have priority of fires in security missions.
3. The LOA for aviation must be *forward* of the ground LOA.
 - a. Aviation's maneuverability and flexibility allows them to move well forward while still maintaining survivability.
 - b. The forward LOA for aviation along with priority of fires will increase the reaction time and maneuver space for the protected force.
4. In order to support extended security mission requirements, aviation commanders must learn to stagger their crews and integrate dismounted OP positions.
5. Aviation commanders must know the ground maneuver commander's decisive point in his plan in order to surge aviation assets to meet the objective.

(TA.6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

TREND 6: Security Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations.
2. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability when compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys and no ability to destroy anything that they do observe.

RESULTS:

1. Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful in security operations by confusing the "shooters" on identification of enemy vehicles, especially beyond 1200 meters. Enemy recon targets are often observed by scouts for only 3 to 5 minutes, which is not enough time to accurately vector a direct fire killing system onto it.
2. Similar looking vehicles, such as HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area, create confusion.
3. Scouts behind "shooters" cannot see as far as the "shooter's" systems.

Techniques:

1. Security operations should be given to company/teams alone.
2. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing observation posts (OPs) *behind* the security force that enable the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires on him while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
3. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, and scouts are limited to destruction with indirect fire.

(TA.6.3.4 Provide Counter Reconnaissance, Security and Readiness)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Recovery missions.

PROBLEM: Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) frequently get directly involved with recovery operations rather than remaining the command and control node for all maintenance operations within the task force (TF).

Techniques:

1. The BMO can move forward with the forward recovery assets, but should not become decisively engaged with recovery operations.
2. The BMO must establish a good recovery plan during the planning process, ensure that his recovery assets are briefed on the plan, and attend the TF CSS rehearsal prior to the mission.

(TA.7.3.2.2 Recover)

TREND 2: Allocation of medical platoon personnel. Leaders lack understanding of how to conduct company/team level health service support (HSS).

PROBLEMS:

1. Medical assets are not effectively positioned or utilized from company/team through task force levels.
2. Company teams seldom use their M113 ambulances to evacuate casualties to battalion aid station (BAS) treatment teams for fear of leaving the unit without medics. Instead, company/ team 1SGs request BAS ambulances to come forward to evacuate patients from their casualty collection point (CCP).

RESULTS:

1. High Died of Wounds (DOW) rate due to lack of timely medical treatment while awaiting evacuation.
2. Medical platoons tie up their ambulance squads evacuating casualties from the company team CCPs.

Techniques:

1. Evacuate casualties from the point of injury or platoon CCP to the company team CCP by using damaged combat vehicles (FM 7-7J, page 2-192) or the 1SG's and Maintenance Team's M113s before using the Combat Medic Section's M113. The platoon's combat lifesaver can perform triage at the platoon CCP to set a priority for casualties to be evacuated as well as the platform needed.
2. The senior medic manages the company team CCP. If there is a shortage of medics, this triage point is the priority for manning; this allows trained medical personnel to treat patients and other personnel to transport/evacuate.
3. Prepare and utilize the commander and 1SG's HMMWVs as non-standard casualty evacuation platforms to move patients to the BAS or treatment team (see FM 8-10-6 for diagrams on how to rig the vehicles).

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 3: (LTP) Planning for Combat Health Support (CHS).

PROBLEM: Combat Health Support (CHS) is not being integrated early enough in the planning process and is not being planned by the right people.

Techniques:

1. To be effective, CHS specifics (locations, times and compositions of BDE assets) should be included in the brigade OPORD so that it gets down to maneuver first sergeants via TF S4s.
2. The brigade medical planners, the brigade S1, and medical company commander (or his designated representative) must standardize taskings to subordinate units, composition of medical assets, lines of communication, and on-hand Class VIII supplies throughout depth of the battlefield by type of battle. This standardized information should become part of the brigade tactical SOP (TASCOP).
3. The brigade medical planners must begin planning after receipt of initial warning order and go forward with an initial plan to the brigade planning process. The brigade order should include specific information such as locations (grids) of planned ambulance exchange points (AXPs) and times they will be active.

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 4: Scout platoon maintenance and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Task forces (TFs) seldom have an adequate CASEVAC or maintenance evacuation plan for scout platoons.

PROBLEM: Scouts must often rely on platoon assets which are unsuitable and degrade recon capabilities to conduct MEDEVAC and maintenance evacuation on the battlefield.

RESULTS:

1. The scouts platoon is slow to fully regenerate personnel and vehicles.
2. The scout platoon is unable to conduct further recon, surveillance or security missions.

Technique: TFs should assign (as a sub-unit task) the closest company/team as responsible for the MEDEVAC and maintenance evacuation for the scouts. The TF should consider providing additional assets to the company/team for this medical and maintenance coverage.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 5: Class III and V reporting and tracking.

PROBLEM: The Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) generally does not receive accurate logistical status from the company/teams and separate platoons in the task force (TF).

RESULT: This impacts the field trains ability to replenish personnel and combat systems as well as forecast Class III and V requirements.

Techniques:

1. Put into place a redundant system to receive accurate logistics status from TF subordinate units.
 - a. Have the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) submit an initial report via FM or MSE.
 - b. Follow this report with a "hard copy" logistics report from the unit supply sergeants.
2. Key FTCP personnel (S1 and S4 NCOIC) must use this status to replenish personnel and combat systems.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 6: Supply and distribution of engineer Class IV and V materials.

PROBLEM: Task forces have difficulty planning and distributing Class IV and V materials to engineer units for defensive operations.

Procedures:

2. Per FM 5-10, *Combat Engineer Platoon*, there are two types of Class IV and V loads: *mission* and *basic*.
 - a. Mission loads consist of those materials required for a specific mission (i.e., a standard-fix minefield).
 - b. Basic loads consist of those materials that the platoon carries to protect itself.
3. For the purpose of saving time, the basic load can be used for specific missions; however, the basic load must then be replenished from the materials in the mission load.
4. Basic loads are pulled; mission loads are pushed.
5. Mission loads are a TF responsibility regardless of the command and support relationship specified for the supporting engineers.

Techniques:

1. Class IV and V resupply for the defense is one of the most demanding logistic operations the task force (TF) must carry out and requires all the assets that can be made available. A total cooperative effort by the TF, including engineers, is required if the defense is to be adequately resourced.
2. Units must exercise and wargame Class IV and V supply and distribution at Home Station. Develop and refine SOPs for resupply operations before deploying to the NTC.
 - a. Maneuver support is essential for command and control, haul assets, and manpower.
 - b. Engineer units must provide quality assurance/control to insure proper handling and breakdown.
4. Palletized standard loads (combat configured loads (CCLs)) and use of the palletized loading system family of vehicles help solve the planning and distribution problems commonly seen at the NTC.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Command Post site location and displacement planning.

PROBLEM: Command post (CP) site location and displacement planning are not effectively integrated into the TF planning process

RESULTS:

1. The TOC is not able to effectively command and control during critical points of the battle.
2. Command and control nodes are not able to support the TF, maintain situational awareness, effectively conduct predictive analysis nor make timely recommendations to the commander.

Techniques:

1. During the planning process, the staff must first identify where the critical points on the battlefield will be located. The staff then conducts backward planning to determine where the TOC must be located at that point to facilitate command and control.
2. Triggers/decision points must be developed to determine when the TOC moves to ensure that they are set during these critical points.
3. The TOC movement/displacement plan is not necessarily tied to the maneuver of the TF. **EXAMPLE:** The TOC does not have to move in the center of the TF formation; it may travel initially behind the lead company/team or along a route that was previously cleared by the scouts or other TF assets. The imperative is that it is set and ready to fight at these anticipated critical points.

(TA.4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2: Non-mission capable (NMC) vehicle status reporting in the task force (TF).

PROBLEM:

1. There is inadequate communication between company maintenance teams chiefs and the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP)
2. There is seldom an established system or SOP to track vehicle damage during the battle and enforcement of the repair timeline for evacuation to the field trains.

RESULT: Confusion on status and location of non-mission capable (NMC) vehicles, which slows recovery and repair time.

Recommendation: Each TF must establish a reporting system to track vehicles damaged during the battle (see CALL Quarterly Bulletin 97-20, Battalion/TF Logistics).

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 3: Mechanized and armor company/team command information flow and battle tracking.

PROBLEMS:

1. Mechanized and armor company/teams too often do not control the flow of information, process the information, and then apply the information to their upcoming fight.
2. The company/teams do not manage information received from higher headquarters and subordinate units. They frequently do not succeed when trying to use a "company CP":
 - a. No single individual or shift coordinates actions in the CP.
 - b. Communications with the task force (TF) are not maintained or rehearsed.
 - c. Vital information is not processed.
 - d. The commander does not identify his CCIR to enable collection of important information.
 - e. SITMAP is not plotted and maintained with all pertinent data.
 - f. The company preparation timeline is not tracked for adherence.
 - g. Unit status of supply, personnel, and readiness (e.g., boresighting) are not tracked.

Procedures:

1. The company CP is now found in FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*, on pages 2-53 and 2-54 (January 1998). Additional TTP for a company level CP or operations center are found in FM 17-97, *Armored Cavalry Troop*.
2. Company/teams can establish a CP of any configuration, but clear designation of *what information* needs to be tracked, and *for what purpose*, is critical.
3. Commanders should establish a timeline with their first WARNO. They must ensure that the TF timeline is adhered to and incorporated into the company timeline.
4. Unit SOPs should ensure that:
 - a. all required steps to preparing for combat are listed.
 - b. completion times are assigned.
 - c. persons responsible for ensuring that each action is complete are identified.

Techniques:

1. CP personnel must maintain contact with subordinate elements and track progress of task completion.
2. The CP must track vital reports such as:
 - a. enemy contact.
 - b. current and proposed friendly locations of both adjacent units and subordinate elements.
 - c. indirect fire requests and reports.
 - d. strength reporting.
3. A tracking *routine* should be established.
 - a. Shift supervisors must be able to routinely check the progress of battle tracking.
 - b. The commander, XO, or ISG must receive periodic updates on a situation map.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 4: Task force (TF) fire support element (FSE) situational awareness.

PROBLEM: Units do not closely coordinate with adjacent units to exchange information on clearance of fires, transition of priority of fires (POF), or security/control measures.

RESULT: TF FSEs repeatedly experience difficulty maintaining situational awareness and conducting battle handover.

Techniques:

1. Close coordination between adjacent units is *mandatory*. This ensures that each unit fully understands how the other intends to operate. Coordination includes:
 - a. Exchanging unit SOPs, target lists, and fire support plans.
 - b. Exchanging front line trace and any control measures in effect.
 - c. Coordinating recognition signals, security measures, and resolving any communications differences.
2. References: FM 6-20-30, FM 6-20-40, FM 71-3.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 5: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) command post (CP) battle tracking.

PROBLEMS:

1. UMCP CPs do not maintain current company/team positions on their tracking boards.
2. UMCP CPs do not update SITEmps posted on their maps.

Techniques:

1. The UMCP CPs post current graphics/company positions and enemy situation on their map.
2. The CP NCOIC ensures that all recovery assets and personnel leaving the UMCP have the current graphic posted on a “take along” map.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 6: Field trains command post (FTCP) battle tracking.

PROBLEMS:

1. The FTCP generally does not have an accurate and “up-to-date” picture of the task force (TF) mission and tactical situation.
2. Unit positions and status are not tracked in the FTCP during the battle.
3. The FTCP is unable to monitor the TF command net.

RESULT: The HHC commander is unable to anticipate logistical requirements based on the tactical situation.

Techniques:

1. The FTCP must receive and post TF operational and enemy situational overlays.
2. A method to track unit positions and status must be developed, posted, and updated as the battle progresses.
3. The FTCP must be able to monitor the TF command net through a retrans or relay element.
4. The HHC commander must anticipate logistical requirements (specifically Class III and V) and be prepared to provide these to the TF.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 7: Task force (TF) staffs and command posts (CPs) battle tracking. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively battle track during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

PROBLEM: Task force (TF) tactical operations centers (TOCs) set up during planning and preparation for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.

RESULTS:

1. Information is not shared, disseminated, and tracked by all the BOS elements.
2. Critical information concerning the R&S effort and "hard-intel" passed from brigade often never reach the S3, Battle Captain, or other BOS elements.
3. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are not proactively tracked, inhibiting the staff's ability to accurately visualize the status of the TF to the commander in their preparation.

Techniques:

1. The chief of staff must identify what information he wants to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections to ensure that it is tracked. End state: The commander can go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of his TF in preparation for combat operations.
2. During planning and prep, TF TOCs should establish a central node similar to the one in place during the fight and track it with the same aggressiveness. This will enable the unit to prepare for combat and re-prioritize efforts (Battle Command-Seeing Ourselves).
3. Effective battle tracking begins with:
 - a. the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis.
 - b. the development of CCIR that must be tracked.
4. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions at Home Station and implement or modify these tracking requirement based on METT-T.
5. CALL Newsletter 95-7 (*Tactical Operations Center*) provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 8: (LTP) Battalion Tactical Operation Center (TOC) dissemination of current enemy situation.

PROBLEM: S2 are tracking the battle at the battalion TOC; however, the current situation is not being disseminated down to the TAC CP and companies.

Technique: Place command emphasis in dissemination of current enemy situation to TAC CPs and line companies.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 9: (LTP) Risk management.

PROBLEM: Risk management is not occurring during the planning process. The task force (TF) is not identifying and assessing risks for an operation.

Technique: The TF commander and XO must emphasize risk management during the planning process.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

TREND 10: (LTP) Company/team commanders' situational awareness.

PROBLEM: Company/team commanders often fail to develop the situation when they make contact. A lack of adequate reporting by subordinates negatively affects the company/team commander's situational awareness.

RESULTS:

1. The company/team is unable to move in and out of contact.
2. The company/team cannot react to contact.
3. The company/team cannot clearly report what is happening to higher.

Techniques:

1. For the company/team commanders to make timely decisions on the battlefield, the subordinates must know how to completely and adequately report what is developing and make recommendations for the appropriate actions/reactions.
2. All members of a unit, including elements that are or can be attached, must be knowledgeable of and thoroughly trained in the proper reporting format (by SOP) and its contents, and have a basic understanding of the appropriate Army doctrine and how this is applied to the current situation.
3. The company/team commanders must train their platoons at Home Station on SOP reporting formats. At a minimum the platoons should know how to:
 - a. Move tactically in and out of contact.
 - b. React to contact.
 - c. Assess the situation quickly.
 - d. Make clearly understood recommendations to the commander in order to maintain the initiative and preserve freedom of action on the battlefield.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

TREND 11: (LTP) Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA).

PROBLEM: Assistant Brigade Engineers (ABE) and engineer battalion S3s do not fully understand the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA).

- a. The engineer battalion S3 and ABE rarely develop an engineer estimate/EBA that can be used in conjunction with the S2's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) prior to mission analysis.
- b. Most ABE's simply assist with the development of the MCOO (Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay) and portions of the enemy and friendly situation.

Procedure: FM 5-71-3 (*Brigade Engineer Combat Operations*) (*Armored*) lays out specific requirements for the development of the EBA. Chapter two of the FM states that the EBA consists of three parts:

- a. terrain analysis.
- b. enemy mission and M/S capabilities.
- c. friendly mission and M/S capabilities.

All three must be analyzed. Therefore, the EBA process must begin immediately following the receipt of the Division's warning order (WARNO). The significance of a timely EBA cannot be overstated as it becomes a basis for the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

(TA.4.2.1 Review Current Situation)

TREND 12: Engineer force development of decision points for changing situations. Engineer commanders and staffs rarely develop decision points with supporting criteria that will ensure continued support to the brigade throughout fluid combat operations.

PROBLEM: Because brigade combat missions are dynamic, the engineer unit's task and purpose change constantly. Corresponding changes to task organization and/or priorities are often required. Commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all possible situations, but are often issuing incomplete and inadequately synchronized FRAGOs as a means of adapting their units to the changing combat situations.

RESULT: The FRAGO method usually results in a loss of momentum at the brigade level and creates difficulties in command, control, and support for the executing unit.

Technique: Commanders and staffs develop clear decision points with pre-established plans to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare, and execute the mission to standard.

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 13: Task force development of the fire support plan during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

PROBLEMS:

1. Key members of the task force (TF) staffs too often do not provide mission analysis briefs to the commander.
2. Poor information dissemination inadequately prepares the TF fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support elements (FSEs) to participate in the planning process.

RESULTS:

1. FSOs/FSEs cannot provide timely and essential information to the subordinate fire support teams (FISTs).
2. The FISTs, in turn, have no time for concurrent planning.
3. In spite of battle staff focus on synchronizing fires with the TF scheme of maneuver, the commander's guidance for fires does not cover the entire operation.
4. Resulting fire support plans lack sufficient detail and coordination to carry through the entire TF mission.

Techniques:

1. Mission Analysis. Upon receipt of the new mission, the FSE begins a battle drill to confirm the current status of the fire support (FS) system and to gather the other needed inputs for the first step in FS planning. These are:

- Higher warning order (WARNO)
- Facts from FA battalion, ALO, and others
- Facts from higher/subordinate FSE & FIST
- IPB products
- Enemy COAs as developed by S2
- High-value targets (HVTs) by enemy phase or critical event

a. The TF FSO must:

- Understand the higher maneuver and FS plan
- Organize and analyze facts
- Identify specified and implied tasks
- Translate status of assets into capabilities and limitations
- Analyze effects of IPB on FS

b. The TF FSO must *brief the results of his mission analysis to the commander* and conclude his brief with recommended essential fire support tasks.

c. Prior to COA development, the TF FSO should receive the commander's approved essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) and issue a WARNO to his subordinate FISTs, the brigade FSE, and the FA battalion.

2. Course of Action Development. As COA development begins, the TF FSO must conceptualize how to integrate fires into the developing COA. The commander's guidance becomes the start point for where and how the FSO allocates assets to each COA.

a. The results of the mission analysis become the foundation for FS COA development.

The FSO uses these results to plan the method for accomplishing the EFSTs. As a minimum, the FS portion of a COA allocates acquisition assets (collection plan), attack assets, planned attack locations (target/TAI/EA), and the sequence (concept of fires) of these attacks required to achieve the effects specified in the EFSTs.

b. The desired output of COA development is a draft fire support plan. The draft FS plan provides the sequence of EFSTs and outlines the task, purpose, method, and end state for each EFST of the operation. The plan must include:

- Concept of fires/draft fires paragraph.
- Draft fire support execution matrix.
- Draft target list worksheet and overlay.
- Draft target synchronization matrix.
- Collection/recon and surveillance plan.

3. Wargaming. The more complete the FS plan is before COA analysis and comparison, the more efficient and effective the wargame.

a. The wargame provides final detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the fire support plan. Based on issues identified by the wargame, the FSO can modify the draft FS plan and products to improve the plan.

b. The wargame also provides a means to test the strength of the plan and build in flexibility by identifying decisions and branches for the FS plan.

c. At the conclusion of the wargame, the FSO should have:

- Final fires paragraph.
- Final fire support execution matrix.
- Final target list and overlay.
- Final scheme of fires.
- Final target synchronization matrix.

4. The Fire Support Annex. Using a cartoon sketch, map overlay, or terrain model can help convey the details of the FS plan more clearly. Once approved, the consolidated products become the fire support annex and are added to the maneuver order.

5. **References:**

a. *Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning"*, CALL Newsletter #95-12 Update, May 97.

b. White Paper: "Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below", Fire Support Division, USFSCAOD, USAFAS, Fort Sill, OK, 6 June 1997.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 14: Maintenance planning at the task force (TF) level.

PROBLEM: The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) is frequently left out of TF planning, OPORD preparation, and rehearsal process.

RESULT: The BMO, unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) personnel, and forward recovery teams are not aware of the enemy situation nor the TF mission.

Techniques:

1. The BMO should be included in the planning process. At a minimum, there must be a maintenance representative for the TF commander or TOC.

2. At the end of each battle, the TF must focus on the combat power that could be developed over the next 2, 6, and 12- hour periods using sound maintenance practices.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 15: Planning for employment of attack helicopters. Commanders (air and ground) do not effectively mass the combat power of attack helicopters.

PROBLEMS:

1. Typically, commanders and their battle staffs fail to accurately assess the threat, identify the decisive point, build a collection plan to confirm the threat's scheme of maneuver, and develop triggers for the employment of attack helicopters.
2. Normally, an attack battalion is assigned numerous missions encompassing the entire width and depth of the battlefield.

RESULTS:

1. The battalion executes numerous "911" missions with poor situational awareness of the threat and friendly forces (resulting in fratricide or excessive aircraft losses).
2. The collection plan does not support the readiness condition sequencing and employment of attack aircraft, which causes the aircraft to remain at higher readiness levels than necessary and imposes unplanned refuel requirements before the mission is executed.
3. Poor triggers cause premature or late commitment of attack helicopters.

Techniques:

1. *Plan:* Attack aviation needs to be integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.
 - a. Commanders should identify the decisive point and the task and purpose of attack helicopters in his guidance to the battle staff.
 - b. Based upon the commander's guidance and the wargame results, the S2 should refine the collection plan to support the commitment of attack helicopters.
 - c. A competent LNO who has the authority to speak for the attack aviation commander must participate in the BCT battle staff's MDMP to ensure the proper employment of attack helicopters.
2. *Prepare:* Attack aviation commanders need to be part of the ground rehearsal. Their maneuver graphics and decision points need to be discussed during the rehearsal to ensure all commanders understand the conditions for commitment of attack aviation and their maneuver plan. This also allows synchronization and redundant eyes on decision points and triggers.
3. *Execute:* The attack battalion TAC should be collocated with the BCT TAC to facilitate situational awareness and anticipate employment. Additionally, attack company commanders need to be prepared to monitor the ground maneuver units command net to synchronize ground and air combat power and reduce the risk of fratricide.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 16: (LTP) Brigade staff understanding of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

PROBLEMS:

1. Most brigade staffers report little recent exposure to the Military Decision-Making Process.
 - a. Many brigade staffs have not collectively practiced staff planning prior to LTP and have no planning SOP.
 - b. Brigade Staffs attending LTP have three to five month's time in position.
 - c. Most brigade staff officer roles and responsibilities have not been clearly identified nor defined, and most brigade XO's spend their LTP time focusing on staff roles, responsibilities, and procedures.
 - d. Staff member's last duty positions were not on a prior staff and most S3 planners and assistant BOS Reps reported no staff experience at all.
2. To an untrained staff and to an XO faced with training the brigade staff to standard under tough time constraints, planning TTP appears to be an attractive solution to shortening the process. In reality, planning TTP confuses, complicates, and frustrates untrained staffs.
3. The Bronco's Abbreviated Decision-Making class (Recently renamed - MDMP-Timed Constrained) is an excellent example of great techniques and procedures applied to the steps in the doctrinal planning process. However, most LTP brigade staffs lack doctrinal and practical staff experience required to apply TTP.

RESULT: Untrained staffs seek TTP as a METHOD to facilitate planning shortcuts. While at LTP, XO's and staff members unsuccessfully apply planning TTP to the staff Military Decision-Making Process.

Techniques:

1. Brigade commanders and staffs must collectively practice and gain full understanding of the MDMP before their LTP session.
2. The Bronco's MDMP-Timed Constrained class is on the mark. However, brigade commanders cannot maximize their unit's LTP experience when their staffs are struggling with fundamental doctrine and unit planning procedures. Recommend commanders accomplish the following prior to their LTP session:
 - a. Develop a unit planning SOP defining commander and staff roles, responsibilities, and procedures.
 - Submit planning SOP to LTP 60-90 days prior to the LTP session.
 - LTP coaches will review the unit's planning SOP and provide the unit feedback prior to their LTP rotation.
 - b. Ensure staffs are trained and understand MDMP IAW FM 101-5.
 - Units with successful LTP experiences have conducted staff planning drills in the weeks and months prior to their LTP training period.
 - Work out problems associated with commander/staff planning procedures and responsibilities at Home Station.
 - c. Come to LTP prepared to apply planning TTP to the MDMP.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 17: (LTP) Task force focus on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) vice doctrine.

PROBLEM: The current practice of addressing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is causing task forces (TFs) to move away from doctrine, endorsing/reinforcing the concept that the purpose of an NTC rotation is to find a way to defeat the OPFOR. TF staffs are consistently in search of the “major notion” that permits winning against the OPFOR.

RESULT: As units arrive at NTC with less Home Station training, pursuit of the “TTP solution” leaves leadership confused as to how to plan.

Techniques:

1. Units must demonstrate a high level of pre-rotational training proficiency in doctrinal procedures before the TTPs can add value.

2. The NTC philosophy should relate TTP as observations, and not allow TTP to become a method unto itself.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 18: (LTP) Aviation Liaison Officer (ALO) integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

PROBLEMS:

1. New ALOs, especially those assigned to newly formed staffs, are not always integrated into the staff.
2. Many ALOs are unfamiliar with the Army’s decision making process, especially *wargaming*.
3. Close air support (CAS) continues to be cited at NTC as the largest killer during brigade force-on-force engagements.

Techniques:

1. The brigade’s ALO is responsible for employing CAS IAW the commander’s intent. He is the ground commander’s senior Air Force advisor and often controls a brigade asset with the equivalent destructive combat power of a mechanized task force.

2. When ALOs fully participate in staff planning sessions, the potential for enormous target effect exists. Training time with the units, Air Force/Army doctrinal expertise by ALO and Army staffs, and everyday Army “lingo” contribute to the ALO’s ability to do his job.

3. Successful employment of CAS is dependent on the ALO’s ability to fully understand his role, responsibilities, and contributions during MDMP.

- a. ALOs need to understand the Army’s MDMP.

- b. The ALO’s CAS planning is accomplished concurrently with the development of the ground scheme of maneuver. Concurrent CAS planning will help prevent CAS from becoming an “add-on” after completion of the plan.

- c. Coordinate collective training events with S3 air, ALO, FSO, and FSCORDs.

- Incorporate the brigade’s CAS METL battle tasks into brigade staff training.

- Focus on tasks assessed as training weaknesses.

- Coordinate in advance for ALO/BALOs/ETACs participation.

4. As a doctrinal self-help tool, staffs can use the Integrated Task List for the Air-Ground Training Feedback System available from CALL website, URL <http://call.army.mil/call.html>.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 19: (LTP) Brigade planning for fire support.

PROBLEM:

1. The brigade fire support element (FSE) does not develop a complete scheme of fires during the planning phase.

- a. Brigade FSE personnel do not normally have all of the tools available they need for wargaming.
- b. They do not have a complete understanding of the product they are supposed to produce.

RESULT: The brigade has no well-developed, completely disseminated, or absolutely understood scheme of fires.

a. The scheme of fires is normally completed *after* the wargame is finished. Thus, the brigade FSO must go back and capture target grids, observer locations, FA position areas, and graphical control measures.

b. Combined arms and fire support rehearsals do not meet the needs of the brigade in ensuring the fire support plan is integrated with maneuver and synchronized.

c. The effects that fire support was to achieve (i.e., suppress, destroy, and obscure) are rarely addressed in detail. Methods are incompletely determined for fire support events.

d. The brigade deep fight quickly becomes ineffective after the first deep engagement.

e. The transition from deep to close to rear normally does not take place.

f. Close air support (CAS) is not effectively integrated into the brigade fire support plan.

g. Artillery movement plans are only loosely tied to fire support events.

h. Staff supervision of the brigade fire support plan is not conducted with a keen eye toward ensuring subordinate organizations are planning and preparing along a course that would result in success for the brigade.

Techniques:

1. Discuss and synchronize events and decision points during course of action development and wargaming, so that the scheme of fires allows subordinates to clearly follow the sequence of events. Provide detailed information. The brigade staff should thoroughly wargame the basic task force fight with specific timelines and triggers. The fire support plan, when issued to subordinate organizations, should give them a framework for planning without fear of massive changes as execution time draws near.

2. Plan the scheme of fire support throughout the brigade's battle space, deep, close, and rear. Too often, the brigade does not plan the close fight, and rear operations are seldom considered.

a. The brigade fire support plan often ends after the last deep engagement, which doctrinally, as well as practically, is not correct. If the brigade only plans deep and puts the burden for all close planning on the task forces, the transition from deep to close will never take place as envisioned by the brigade fire support officer.

b. If, instead, the brigade plans the fire support fight throughout the zone or sector by planning one continuous fight, he can force the transition from deep to close to rear. There will be no gaps in the transition because it is a single integrated plan developed by a single headquarters.

3. The very essence of top-down fire planning is that the brigade fire support element develops the fire support plan and subordinate fire support elements refine it. In transitioning from deep to close to rear, the brigade is not handing off *fires* to subordinate headquarters. Rather, it is handing them the entire *responsibility for execution* of the brigade fire support plan. The scheme of fires worksheet has proven effective for facilitating this planning and refinement. An example of a completed worksheet for a portion of the scheme of fire support is shown below as a way to capture results of the wargame.

PHASE	I - DEEP FIGHT			This line corresponds to maneuver phases.
TRIGGER/DP	CRPs at NAI 4	CAS Tot - 2 min	N. MB MRC at AN 9000	This line is used to provide the trigger to execute the FS event or to indicate a DP that would move us to another event - top-down .
			Panel marker NK 123456	This block is for the specific on-the-ground trigger - bottom-up refined .
FS EVENT	1. AN 9001	2. AN 0001	3. CTB 2	Event sequence # and target or CTB #.
	FASCAM	SEAD for CTB 2	CAS on N. MRC	Description of event - asset and HPT.
PRI OBS/EXE	COLT 1	COLT 1	ETAC 1	Primary executor - may need bottom-up refinement .
OP LOCATION				Primary executor location to execute from - bottom-up refinement .
ALT OBS/EXE	COLT 2	COLT 2	COLT 1	Alternate executor - may need bottom-up refinement .
OP LOCATION				Alternate executor to execute from - bottom-up refinement .
TASK	Emplace FASCAM minefield to delay N. MRB in passes	Suppress AA in MRC/mark TGT area	Destroy 1 tank and 3 BMPs in N. MRC	Task of this event: Tells observer what he is trying to do with this event = attack guidance. Enemy formation and effect .
PURPOSE	To allow attack by CAS	To prevent losses to CAS aircraft while attacking N. MRC at FASCAM	To attrit 1/3 from N. MRC and delay N. MRB	Purpose of this event: Tell observer why he is attacking the event so he can do the right thing without additional guidance. In terms of friendly maneuver .
EFFECTS	N. MRB delayed 10 min	AAA suppressed at H-1 UP mark	N. MRB delayed 5 min	Effects or end state of event - gives us criteria to assess our event and reattack if required.
WPN/UNIT	R BN 155	DS BN 155	2 A-10s	The top-down asset to accomplish task.
MUNITIONS/VOLUME	96 RAAMs 24 ADAMS med density	BN 3 DPICM 1 GUN WP	8 Maverick	The bottom-up refinement from FA or ALO on the specifics of the attack asset.
FSCM	CFL PL BLOOD NFA 1, NFA 2	CFL PL BLOOD NFA 1, NFA 2	CFL PL BLOOD NFA 1, NFA 2	The FSCM that supports the event or changes with the event.
ACA			ACA BLUE	ACA in effect
NOTES		CTB 2: 1234-1236-1638-1644	CTB 2: 1234-1236-1638-1644	Other notes or remarks

4. Conduct complete and thorough staff supervision of the plan. The scheme of fire support worksheet provides an excellent staff supervision document.

a. To alert the brigade FSE and subordinates, highlight with dark lines any areas that require bottom-up refinement. Subordinate elements should be required to submit the execution details of that event (i.e., exact trigger description and grid, the time the trigger was emplaced, refined target number and grid for the same task and purpose, refined primary target number and grid for the same task and purpose, refined primary and alternate observers and OP grid, and refined weapon/unit/munition/volume).

b. As the information is received from subordinates, the brigade FSE can determine whether the subordinate's plan will accomplish the event properly (i.e., triggers in the proper location, volume of fire sufficient to achieve the required effects, etc.). If further refinement is necessary, direct that the refinement take place.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 20: (LTP) Armor task force (TF) understanding of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

PROBLEM: Armor task forces (TFs) are consistently unable to plan following the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

a. TF staffs are unfamiliar with the MDMP-- the sequence, the events constituting the planning process, and what products are generated.

b. Failure to understand and be able to apply the MDMP makes transitioning to an abbreviated format nearly impossible for the staff, given the limited level of experience the staff members have in planning combat operations.

Procedure: The MDMP is thoroughly described in FM 101-5. Units should practice the process during Home Station exercises so that they are familiar with the sequence, events, and products before deploying to NTC.

Technique: Total familiarity with the MDMP before arriving at NTC gives brigade and TF staffs the foundation needed for transition to an abbreviated process when time is limited.

When staffs are unfamiliar with the MDMP upon arrival at NTC, they must be trained on each event of the process, followed immediately by a "hot-wash" AAR. Unfortunately, this is a time-consuming technique that the LTP schedule seldom permits. On those occasions when we can afford these "hot-wash" AARs, they prove extremely profitable to the unprepared unit.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 21: (LTP) Integration of Special Staff into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

PROBLEM The forward support battalion (FSB) commander and XO often fail to ensure integration of the special staff into the Military Decision-Making process (MDMP) and orders drill.

Technique: Integration of the FSB staff and special staff can be accomplished if participation is required at all levels, from brigade order drills through NTC rotations. By enforcing the integration of special staff at Home Station until it is habitual, the proper mix of players will be present for advanced training at NTC.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 22: (LTP) Rear battle planning.

PROBLEMS:

1. The brigade seldom plans for the rear battle.
2. The S2's reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan does not cover the rear battle space.
3. The brigade communication officer's plan does not include retrans to the rear.
4. The forward support battalion (FSB) commander does not have the resources to execute a rear battle plan.

Technique: The brigade S4 and FSB support operations officer (SPO), as the brigade logistics planners, should request R&S information from the brigade S2, thus compelling the S2 to look at the rear battle space area. They should also coordinate with the brigade communications officer to see what the brigade can provide. This information should then be provided to the FSB commander and S3 for planning purposes.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 23: (LTP) Task force wargaming. Most task forces use poor wargaming techniques and procedures.

PROBLEMS:

1. Critical events, such as results of the deep operations and the current R&S plan, are not posted/set on the wargaming board.
2. Battalion staffs are often unaware of the most current situation.
3. S2s are usually dominated by S3s.
4. The staff begins the wargame before the course of action is fully developed.

RESULTS:

1. Lack of S2 input results in wargaming a more "cooperative OPFOR" and an unrealistic arbitration of losses by the XO.
2. The staff wastes time trying to understand and develop the course of action during the wargame.

Techniques:

1. Fully develop the course of action before the wargame.
2. Post critical events on the wargaming board.
3. Give the S2 sufficient time to present a complete picture of the enemy.
4. Stay informed--maintain situation awareness.

(TA.4.3.4 Compare Courses of Action)

TREND 24: (LTP) Task force (TF) synchronization of tactical operations.

PROBLEM: Synchronization is a problem at every level.

a. Synchronization problems are seldom addressed because task force (TF) staffs do not understand the mechanisms of the planning process that provide synchronization.

b. Most TF staffs are not effective at wargaming and avoid wargaming in depth because of a lack of experienced personnel on the staff who understand how to wargame properly.

RESULT: Critical operational issues are not surfaced, the wargame fails, and synchronization is not achieved.

Technique: Wargaming should be added as an elective class to the Leader Training Program (LTP) at NTC. The significance of TF staff misunderstandings of wargaming precludes them from correcting synchronization problems at Home Station.

(TA.4.3.4 Compare Courses of Action)

TREND 25: (LTP) Brigade targeting team. During the planning process, the brigade targeting team does not properly focus the commander on high-payoff targets to assist in the development of essential fire support tasks during various phases of the fight.

PROBLEMS:

1. Normally, the targeting team does not convene during the planning process.
2. High-value targets (HVTs) are not selected or are only briefly discussed but not defined sufficiently to allow an observer to know when and where to attack a target.

RESULT: Observers cannot focus on what the commander wants to kill by priority/by phase. This has a direct impact on the maneuver brigade's ability to execute the battle.

Techniques:

1. The brigade should convene the targeting team during the planning process as well as the preparation and execution phases.
 - a. The targeting team, at a minimum, should consist of the brigade XO, brigade fire support officer (FSO), targeting officer, and the brigade S2.
 - b. The targeting team must identify high-value targets (HVTs) and then develop high- payoff targets (HPTs) during various phases of the fight.
 - c. The S2 must discuss the element (potential HVT) required by the enemy to achieve each critical event of a given COA. With this start point the commander can focus the staff with clearer guidance on interdicting key enemy critical events by attacking some of critical enemy elements to achieve a specific effect. Our friendly COAs can then be built focused on how we will effectively find and attack these HPTs with fire and maneuver to accomplish the mission.
2. The bulk of the targeting process occurs during the wargaming session and must follow the decide, detect, and deliver methodology. Here the FSO is most effective if he is an active participant.
 - a. The FSO must come to the table with all of the necessary tools and information required to wargame, such as:
 - The current and projected status of all fire support assets and systems.
 - All the necessary planning factors that relate to fire support.
 - All of the products produced during mission analysis.
 - A complete understanding of the COAs.
 - Knowledge of the commander's guidance.
 - A method to record the results and to develop a scheme of fire support.
 - b. The FSO must be prepared throughout the wargaming process to make recommendations for addition or deletion of high-payoff targets to the HPT list.
 - The FSO, along with the rest of the targeting team, must determine effects necessary on HPTs to achieve the commander's intent.
 - The FSO, with his fire support staff (ALO, targeting officer, AVN LNO, S3 air, etc.), will be the driving force in recommending engagement means for HPTs if the targeting team has decided that fire support should engage the target.
 - c. The FSO needs to be prepared to wargame each fire support event thoroughly. The FSO will then take the results of each fire support event occurring during the wargame and translate them into targets IAW commander's guidance and commander's intent.

(TA.4.3.4 Compare Courses of Action)

TREND 26: Battalion maintenance officer (BMO) troop leading procedures.

PROBLEM: The BMO does not use troop leading procedures effectively or establish priorities of work at the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP).

- a. Inadequate timelines.
- b. Inadequate WARNOs and OPORDs.
- c. Inadequate rehearsals.
- d. Junior leaders are frequently prevented from conducting their own pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) prior to each mission.

Techniques:

1. The BMO and the UMCP establish a timeline that can support the upcoming missions.
2. The BMO must ensure that the maintenance platoon understands the mission requirements.
3. Maintenance platoons need to stay aware of the tactical situation. The main focus is to get combat power back into the battle, and maintenance leaders must ensure mission accomplishment.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 27: Engineer company time management and tactical assembly area (TAA) discipline.

PROBLEMS:

1. Engineer companies routinely do a poor job of time management. Critical pre-battle activities such as pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs), rehearsals, and graphics dissemination frequently suffer.
2. Many engineer companies are not prepared to defend themselves prior to crossing the lines of departure (LD).
 - a. During the mission's combat preparation phase, the engineer companies usually accomplish such things as personal hygiene, LOGPAC, and their sleep plan.
 - b. Time is wasted due to poor planning and lack of leader discipline at the company and platoon level.
3. Commanders usually include critical activities in their company OPORDs but do not monitor their accomplishment.
4. Most engineer companies arrive at the NTC with a good tactical SOP (TACSOP) that clearly addresses TAA procedures, but they *do not follow it*.
 - a. Companies frequently occupy TAAs with no advance party activities or recon.
 - b. Few, if any, priorities of work are accomplished.
 - c. Direct fire plans and adjacent unit coordination are not accomplished.

RESULTS:

1. Companies are not prepared to defend against any type of attack in their TAA.
2. Companies experience loss of battle tempo and poor mission accomplishment.

Techniques:

1. Engineer company commanders must conduct aggressive time management. They must be immediately informed of any problems in order to reprioritize in tempo.
2. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and junior NCOs must apply the discipline to make it happen. Unit discipline must be maintained during TAA occupation, including adherence to their TACSOP.
3. Critical pre-battle activities must be accomplished to ensure mission success. These activities should be integrated with:
 - a. TAA procedures.
 - b. TF-directed events.
 - c. A timeline that specifically addresses who will do what and when.
4. Timelines must be passed to subordinate units as soon as possible. Company leaders must ruthlessly enforce the completion of these activities IAW the timeline.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 28: (LTP) Brigade S2 section use of standard operating procedures (SOPs).

PROBLEM: Brigade S2 sections often lack standard operating procedures (SOPs).

- a. S2 sections are often not sure of the intelligence requirements for the different phases of the staff planning process.
- b. When a comprehensive SOP exists, it is often not followed.
- c. Some existing SOPs do not specifically address the requirements for the brigade S2 section.

RESULT: Each staff planning session is fraught with discovery learning to determine what is required to support the staff planning process, rather than an improvement to the requirements that are already defined.

Procedure: At Home Station, each S2 section should develop and *use* an SOP that provides a checklist and formatted charts.

- a. The SOP should address the products that will be routinely required of the S2 section for each phase of the staff planning process.
- b. These products would be based on standard requirements as well as staff and commander driven requirements.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 29: (LTP) Company/team development and use of Tactical SOPs (TACSOPs).

PROBLEM: Company/team Tactical SOPs are incomplete or non-existent.

- a. In almost every instance, company commanders come to their LTP without a viable, workable TACSOP. The standard reply when asked about their TACSOPs is, "We are refining it out here." With 120 days remaining before their NTC rotation (fewer training days for NG/USAR units), there is no time for the refinement, development, and implementation of an effective TACSOP.
- b. For a TACSOP to be effective, all members of a unit must be knowledgeable of and thoroughly trained in its contents. This includes all elements that are/can be cross attached to a commander's unit.

Technique: Continually stress the importance of TACSOPs and the need for company/team commanders to come to LTP with a complete and workable TACSOP.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 30: Integration of the medical platoon into the planning process.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units typically do not have a method to integrate the medical plan into the CSS plan and the maneuver plan.
2. The medical platoon does not know the plan until the CSS rehearsal.

RESULTS:

1. No troop leading procedures or adjacent unit coordination prior to the CSS rehearsal.
2. Questions brought up at the CSS rehearsal are not answered.
3. When the battle starts, needed information is not properly disseminated to the unit.

Techniques:

1. The S4 should develop an SOP for dissemination of information during the planning process. Include a process for receiving input from all CSS operators to synchronize the CSS plan.
2. Develop and disseminate information early to permit the CSS operators to conduct adjacent unit coordination and have answers to all questions at the CSS rehearsal.
3. When the CSS battle is rehearsed, all participants at the CSS rehearsal must leave with a true understanding of how all aspects of the CSS battle will flow.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 31: Task force (TF) timeline management.

PROBLEMS:

1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively manage a TF timeline.
2. Staff sections do not complete required products in a timely manner.

RESULTS:

1. Critical events fail to take place.
2. Troop leading procedures at subordinate levels are hindered.
3. Ultimately, the TF is prevented from seeing itself in preparation for combat.
4. The staff does not have enough time to adequately wargame the selected COA.
5. Orders lack focus on killing the enemy at the decisive point and often lead to unclear tasks and purpose to subordinate leaders.

Techniques:

1. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.
2. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times, etc.).
3. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events are also added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.
4. Key events from the synchronization matrix should also be incorporated into the timeline. This allows critical tasks to be tracked throughout the battle and provides a valuable tool in battle tracking.
5. Upon completion of the planning process, the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and brief it as part of the TF OPORD.
6. In the timeline, include critical troop leading procedures (TLPs) to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and LOGPAC.
7. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage company/teams but rather to provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level, the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 32: Engineer company planning process.

PROBLEMS:

1. At Home Station, during TF level engineer NTC training and preparation computer exercises, engineer company commanders conduct their own EBA and write both the TF engineer annex and engineer company OPORD. Company commanders expect to personally produce these products during the NTC campaign.
2. Engineer company executive officers (XOs) are not trained to conduct an Engineer Battlefield Analysis (EBA).
3. Engineer company XOs are not trained to write the TF engineer annex and the company OPORD.

RESULTS:

1. After arrival at the NTC, one of two things occurs. Either:
 - a. the company commander tries to do everything as he did at Home Station and is reduced to a frazzle by Training Day 3; or
 - b. the commander recognizes battle rhythm demands and passes the planning and order preparation tasks to the company XO, who then struggles with a steep learning curve during the campaign.
2. Both company and TF suffer incomplete engineer planning.

Techniques:

1. Engineer company commanders must train their XOs at Home Station to conduct EBA and to prepare both the TF engineer annex and engineer company OPORD.
2. Company commanders should be able to give the XO clear guidance on the mission, intent, and end-state, and then make the XO responsible for producing the three products.

RESULT: The engineer company commander can focus on troop leading procedures (TLPs) and pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 33: Integration of engineer units into the planning process.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task forces (TFs) are typically placing the engineer plan in an annex of the OPORD. The maneuver elements seldom read that portion of the OPORD and do not understand the scheme of engineer operations (SOEO). This can be disastrous when it includes specified tasks to non-engineer subordinate units.
2. TFs are not allowing the engineer planner to brief during mission analysis and the COA presentations, omitting critical mobility and survivability information.
3. Engineer command posts (CPs) are not fully integrated in the TF tactical operations centers (TOCs), causing a breakdown of the brigade engineer's intent at TF level.
4. Mobility, countermobility, survivability tasks are seen as engineer-unit specific.

Techniques:

1. The TF engineer must ensure that required engineer missions, instructions, constraints, and limitations are included in the TF OPORD (not buried in the engineer annex).
2. The TF must allow the engineer planner to brief during both the mission analysis and the COA presentations so that critical mobility and survivability information is communicated to all elements of the TF.
3. The SOEO is refined during wargaming and is the basis for the engineer company order.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 34: (LTP) Essential fire support (FS) tasks and concept of fires development.

PROBLEM: Fire support coordinators (FISCOORDs) and brigade fire support officers (FSOs) try to identify and define critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) (task, purpose, method, and end state) based in the commander's guidance and friendly course of actions; however, their stated purpose(s) do not always provide sufficient information to set the parameters of when, where, and how long.

RESULT: The FS system cannot easily or realistically quantify the required end state in terms of volume and duration or amount of destruction, suppression, or obscuration.

Techniques:

1. When defining CFSTs, the task should specify:
 - a. The enemy's attack formation we want to affect.
 - b. The functions of the enemy's attack formation we want to influence.
 - c. The target effect we want to have on the enemy's formation's function.
2. Doctrinal terms, such as, delay, limit, disrupt, and destroy can be useful, but what is essential is that fire supporters and maneuver understand each other clearly.
 - a. *Delay* is not allowing the enemy to do something *when* he wants to.
 - b. *Limit* -- *where* he wants to.
 - c. *Disrupt* -- *what* he wants to.
 - d. *Destroy* -- requires us to quantify a specific amount to be killed.
3. The task is focused on the enemy. The purpose, on the other hand, is focused on friendly maneuver and sets the parameters on how long we must delay, where we must limit, and when we must disrupt or destroy in terms of friendly maneuver events. The clearer the effects of fires are tied to a maneuver purpose, the more likely that we can integrate fires and maneuver to achieve a unified effect.
4. The end state should be quantifiable in terms that allow the field artillery to determine the volume of fires, munitions, duration and/or other technical parameters and that will achieve the stated task and purpose.

EXAMPLE:

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE: (*effect*) Delay the (*formation*) AGMB's (*function*) ability to support the FSE until (*purpose*) our direct fires can destroy the FSE.

CONCEPT OF FIRES: (*method*) Use ARTY-delivered FASCAM in the passes in conjunction with CAS and massed ARTY fires to delay the AGMB until our AG company can destroy the FSE with direct fires.

FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT ACTIONS: Determine good locations to emplace FASCAM based on enemy, terrain, and weapons capabilities. Determine possible OPs that could observe. Determine how CAS could be used for each COA (CAS target box data). Consider how IEW, smoke or obstacles might contribute to the desired effect. Determine the possible HPTs in the AGMB that would DELAY. List data needed from Wargame, for example:

How long does the AG company need to destroy FSE?

What number and type of vehicles = delay required?

END STATE: (From Wargame) AGMB delayed 15 minutes at FASCAM. MSD destroyed at FASCAM. Two T-80s and six BMPs destroyed west of PL DALLAS. MRB CMD net jumps < 5 times between PL OHIO and PL DALLAS.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 35: (LTP) Task force (TF) executive officer (XO) management of timelines.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force (TF) executive officers (XOs) are not successfully managing planning time. During the conduct of LTP, this responsibility is continually delegated to junior Battle Captains.
2. Routinely, staff members lack the experience and understanding of how long each phase of the planning process should take.

RESULT: The process quickly loses structure, focus, and productivity.

Technique: Time management will improve only when it becomes an absolute priority of brigade and task force commanders. Emphasis must be placed on the application of time management techniques at all levels.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 36: (LTP) Time management.

PROBLEM: Time management at brigade and task force (TF) level remains a notable weakness. Commanders have dismissed the one-third/two-third planning philosophy and routinely disregard subordinate elements' need to plan.

Procedure: Adopt a structured schedule that requires brigades and TFs to issue their operations orders on directed timelines, thus forcing one-third/two-third planning times on to the respective staffs.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 37: Task force (TF) fire support rehearsals. TF fire support rehearsals are frequently not conducted. When they are conducted, they lack a standard format, a clear task and a purpose.

Techniques:

1. The types of fire support rehearsals available are:
 - a. Sand table/terrain model.
 - b. Map rehearsal.
 - c. FM (radio) rehearsals.
2. Regardless of the type of rehearsal conducted, the following must be verified:
 - a. Target list.
 - b. Observation plan.
 - c. Scheme of fires.
 - d. Execution triggers.
 - e. Timing of events.
 - f. Both primary and alternate communications nets.
 - g. Fire support coordinating measures.
3. The fire support officer (FSO) must coordinate with the TF XO/S3 to ensure that the fire support rehearsal is included in the TF timeline. Schedule the TF fire support rehearsal as early as possible after the company FISTs have rehearsed their plans. Preferably, this will occur before the TF maneuver rehearsal.

4. References: FM 6-20-40; CALL Newsletter #91-1, *Rehearsals*.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 38: Direct fire plan rehearsals.

PROBLEMS:

1. Companies often fail to conduct rehearsals, and when they are conducted, they do not focus on the direct fire plan or critical actions at the objective.
2. Commanders do not conduct rehearsals with a clear end state or ensure that all crews understand the direct fire plan.
3. Commanders too often fail to discuss contingencies and clearly articulate how the direct fire plan will be adjusted as the situation changes.
4. Battalion commanders and S3s fail to conduct adequate rehearsals to ensure that the attack company's direct fire plans are synchronized and that they support the commander's intent.

Techniques:

1. Commanders at all levels must set the standard for rehearsals.
 - a. They must have a clear vision of the end state for the rehearsal.
 - b. They must rehearse until all members of the team understand how the operation will be conducted.
2. A standardized terrain model kit is a useful tool and cuts down on set-up time.
3. Commanders must properly allocate time for rehearsals and closely guard this time to ensure that rehearsals are not bypassed.
4. Companies and battalions should routinely conduct rehearsals at Home Station to allow subordinates to see the standards to which rehearsals should be conducted and work out the TTP that best facilitates every member of the team in understanding the mission.
5. Once the unit has established and validated their TTP for rehearsals, they should incorporate them into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 39: Maintenance personnel crew-served and individual weapons cleaning.

PROBLEM: Maintenance personnel are not maintaining their crew-served and individual weapons to standard.

- a. The weapons are not being cleaned or serviced.
- b. Most of the weapons observed have no ammunition.

RESULT: Weapons failure is catastrophic when rear areas are attacked.

Techniques:

1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) absolutely must ensure that his subordinates enforce weapons cleaning and service.
2. The BMO must coordinate with the S4 for ammunition supply.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 40: Unit discipline on the battlefield.

PROBLEMS:

1. Unit leaders do not routinely monitor or emphasize troop discipline in the following areas:
 - a. Load plans.
 - b. Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) procedures.
 - c. Uniform.
 - d. Weapon security.
 - e. Maintenance and personnel accountability.
2. Clear standards are not identified or enforced while at the NTC.
3. Leaders are reluctant to make corrections, assume responsibility, or be held accountable.
4. Unit leaders generally fail to assign responsibility for key actions and do not hold personnel accountable.

Techniques:

1. NCOs must be the backbone of unit standards; however, *all* leaders play a key role in setting and enforcing standards.
2. Senior leaders must assign responsibility for actions and hold personnel accountable.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 41: Breach tenets in mission analysis and course of action (COA) development.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a misunderstanding and, therefore, an incorrect application of the "breach tenets" at the TF level. The breach tenets (intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass, and synchronization) are overlooked during mission analysis and COA development.
2. Generally, units do not reverse plan actions on the objective. There is no specified, clearly defined end state of what the TF should look like on the objective.

RESULT: The TF fails to synchronize breaching operations as part of the overall scheme of maneuver.

Techniques:

1. TF commanders must ensure synchronization through proper planning and force preparation. The keys are:
 - a. detailed reverse planning
 - b. clear sub-unit instructions
 - c. effective command and control
 - d. a well-rehearsed force
2. Actions on the objective should define the point of penetration and the size and type of assault force.
3. The location of the planned point of penetration and the size and type of assault force then determines the point of breach, number of lanes required, and the size and type of security forces (both near and far side).
4. The ability of the enemy's infantry to interfere with the breach determines whether the breaching site is to be secured by fires or by force.
5. Lane requirements and the type of obstacles then drive the allocation of mobility assets.
6. Finally, the enemy's fires at the obstacle determines the amount of suppression and size of the support force.
7. Reverse planning defines the maneuver formation to ensure that forces are in the correct relative positions to accomplish their breaching roles and actions on the objective.
8. The most effective breaching tool available to the commander is the *rehearsal*. TF rehearsals should focus on synchronizing the maneuver of support, breach, and assault forces to achieve the suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR) breaching fundamentals and highlight key events that must be coordinated during breach execution.
9. The commander's intent must be carefully considered during breach planning.
10. The TF main effort must be clear and must be supported by the scheme of engineer operations (SOEO). The engineer must understand the scheme of maneuver and must plan to shift engineer forces and equipment consistent with the commander's main effort. This shifting of forces is even more critical in successive breach operations. The engineer planner ensures that the SOEO serves as a combat multiplier and not just a force provider.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 42: Integrating aviation planning into the scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a lack of an integrated planning between the aviation and ground maneuver elements.
 - a. The aviation and ground maneuver elements plan in a vacuum from one another.
 - b. Aviation is usually assigned tasks after wargaming is completed.
2. The geographical distances between the aviation TAAs and the ground maneuver TOC/TACs add to the problem.

RESULTS:

1. Poor synchronization between air and ground forces.
2. Uncommon maneuver graphics.
3. Uncommon control measures.
4. Poor air/ground communication plans.
5. Improperly assigned priority of fires.
6. Attack-by-fire positions and engagement areas that do not support the ground maneuver plan.

Techniques:

1. Assign an air LNO to the ground maneuver element for the planning of all base orders and on a case-by-case basis for specific follow-on missions.
 - a. The air LNO must have sufficient technical and tactical competence to be a productive force in the planning process.
 - b. If possible, the air LNO can remain with the ground maneuver TAC during mission execution.
2. Combined arms rehearsals between the ground and air maneuver elements are also essential to mission success.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 43: (LTP) Synchronization of Tactical Operations.

PROBLEM: Task force (TF) staffs continue to have difficulty achieving synchronization.

- a. Most staffs believe that there is a single planning event that results in a fully synchronized operation.
- b. No TF staff attending LTP this quarter created a synchronization matrix.
- c. Most staffs discount the effort of synchronizing the plan as being too time-consuming and difficult for what they perceive as a limited benefit.
- d. During after-action reviews (AARs), commanders assert their desire to produce synchronization, but staffs are unwilling to dedicate the time needed to lay the framework for it to occur.

Techniques:

1. TF commanders must focus their planning process input (initial staff guidance and course of action (COA) analysis) toward the battlefield operating systems (BOS).
2. Commanders must become more involved in teaching synchronization to their staffs during Home Station planning exercises.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)